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About Rebuild by Design
Founded as a response to Superstorm Sandy’s devastation along the East Coast of 
the United States, Rebuild by Design is an initiative dedicated to creating innovative 
community- and policy-based solutions to protect US cities that are most vulnerable to 
increasingly intense weather events and future uncertainties. Initiated by the US Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development and the Presidential Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding 
Task Force, Rebuild by Design aims to connect the world’s most talented researchers and 
designers with businesses, policymakers and local groups in the Sandy-affected area in 
order to better understand how to redevelop their communities in ways that are environ-
mentally and economically healthier and better prepared.
About the Urban Institute
Founded in 1968 to understand the problems facing America’s cities and assess the 
programs of the War on Poverty, the Urban Institute brings decades of objective analysis 
and expertise to policy debates – in city halls and state houses, Congress and the White 
House, and emerging democracies around the world. Today, our research portfolio ranges 
from the social safety net to health and tax policies; the well-being of families and neigh-
borhoods; and trends in work, earnings, and wealth building. Our scholars have a distin-
guished track record of turning evidence into solutions.
About the Rockefeller Foundation Evaluation Office
For more than 100 years, the Rockefeller Foundation’s mission has been to promote the 
well-being of humanity throughout the world. Today, the Rockefeller Foundation pursues 
this mission through dual goals: advancing inclusive economies that expand opportunities 
for more broadly shared prosperity, and building resilience by helping people, communi-
ties and institutions prepare for, withstand and emerge stronger from acute shocks and 
chronic stresses. Committed to supporting learning, accountability and performance im-
provements, the Evaluation Office of the Rockefeller Foundation works with staff, grantees 
and partners to strengthen evaluation practice and to support innovative approaches to 
monitoring, evaluation and learning.
Cover photo: Cameron Blaylock
The contents of this report are the views of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Rockefeller Foundation. 
© 2014, The Rockefeller Foundation
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Preface
The unprecedented damage Hurricane Sandy caused along the East Coast of the US, especially 
to the densely populated New York and New Jersey coastlines,  was a wake-up call to the threat 
that weather events pose to our communities. The world has always been plagued by severe and 
seemingly intractable problems, including storms, but today, we live with an unprecedented level of 
disruption.  Things go wrong with more frequency and severity, greater complexity, and with more 
inter-related effects. No longer can we afford to simply rebuild what existed before. We must begin 
to rethink our recovery efforts,  making sure the damaged region is resilient enough to rebound from 
future storms.
In order to better protect Sandy-area residents from future climate events the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development and President Obama’s Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force 
initiated Rebuild by Design (RBD) to develop fundable solutions that address structural and environ-
mental vulnerabilities throughout the East Coast region. Recognizing the enormity of this challenge, 
the RBD process has looked beyond traditional solutions, supporting new approaches in architec-
tural design, regional planning and environmental engineering, all of which are set within an innova-
tive process that combines public, philanthropic and private sector resources and knowledge with 
community participation in a design competition.
As a lead funding partner for RBD, the Rockefeller Foundation provided financial support for the 
Urban Institute to evaluate the RBD design competition and assess what worked well and what 
should be improved in the ongoing management, design implementation and collaborative approach 
of RBD. The evaluation also considered to what extent RBD can be regarded as a model for building 
national resilience. We are grateful to Carlos Martin and his team from the Urban Institute for the 
timely lessons from this evaluation which have helped to inform the Foundation’s urban resilience 
work going forward.  
We are pleased to share the evaluation with our partners and stakeholders, and to contribute to the 
broader learning in the field of urban resilience. By advancing this public-philanthropic collaboration, 
we hope to continue to strengthen our nation’s resilience, enabling people, communities and insti-
tutions to be prepared for, withstand and emerge stronger from future shocks and chronic stresses.
Nancy MacPherson Nancy Kete
Managing Director, Evaluation Managing Director, Resilience
The Rockefeller Foundation The Rockefeller Foundation
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Executive summary
Rebuild by Design (RBD) was formally launched on June 20, 2013, to ensure that the rebuilding 
after Hurricane Sandy incorporated designs that built in resilience. RBD was launched with strong 
public leadership, philanthropic support and professional interest within the design community. The 
early enthusiasm for RBD came as much from curiosity about RBD’s vision and ambition as from 
the substantial size of the implementation awards from the Community Development Block Grant 
Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funds that Congress appropriated to the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development for Hurricane Sandy Recovery. 
Phase I of RBD held true to the vision of iteratively responding to science-based evidence and to local 
citizens and community groups through open-ended design techniques. These activities unfolded 
in various ways and to different ends throughout Phase I’s three stages – Stage 1: team selection, 
Stage 2: research, and Stage 3: community engagement. RBD managers also kept an eye on the 
feasibility of design proposals from technical, financial and political perspectives – parameters that 
have all been heavily shaped by RBD’s post-Sandy New York context. 
As part of its ongoing commitment to learn from the work it supports, the Rockefeller Foundation 
provided funding for the Urban Institute to evaluate the design competition component of Phase 1 
of RBD, including its innovative aspects, partnerships and community engagement.
The highly positive findings of the evaluation indicate that even though RBD itself is limited in scope 
to the Sandy recovery area, it has the potential to be transformational in the way disaster recovery 
efforts are designed, funded and implemented at a broader scale in the US. With the caveat that the 
evaluation looked only at the design competition phase, RBD brings hope and inspiration that col-
lectively communities and decision makers can ‘build back better’ by responding in innovative and 
creative ways and working as a region to become more resilient. In sum, RBD has moved the mark 
on resilience action in the U.S. 
In particular, the evaluation found that RBD’s design competition is an innovative strategy for 
meeting resilience goals. By successfully complementing traditional public procurement, RBD 
involved public-philanthropic financing, and produced an alternative organizational structure.  
RBD has also laid the groundwork for producing innovation in the long term. It has done this 
through increased community awareness, a reconsideration of regional connections and shared 
needs among policymakers, and most critically, the engineering and environmental benefits from 
the proposed infrastructure improvements – though the final project outcomes are yet to be seen. 
Though the overwhelming majority of findings were positive,  the evaluation notes a  few  chal-
lenges in RBD’s planning. For example, the model’s creators did not establish a clear administra-
tive plan  prior to execution,  leading to crisis-driven management during execution. Much of this 
challenge came from the fact that the original RBD vision was more aspirational than operational. 
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Both of these oversights and related challenges should be addressed in future attempts to replicate 
the RBD model. In this competition, however, the RBD executive team, support partners and design 
teams ultimately completed all tasks on schedule despite the challenges.
The following specific findings and recommendations are further detailed in the main body of the 
evaluation:
Findings 
1. HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan’s leadership and the commitment of CDBG-DR funds were 
critical inputs. Ultimately, the size of that resource commitment proved to be a critical 
motivator. HUD’s innovative use of statutory authority for allocating CDBG-DR departed from 
the traditional method of fund outlays (i.e., formula allocations based on estimates of damage 
and unmet needs). In turn, the use of these funds to implement RBD-designed regional in-
frastructure projects departed from traditional activities for which these funds had been used 
in post-disaster scenarios (e.g. rebuilding of individual homes or public buildings or economic 
development activities).
2. The charisma and vision of Henk Ovink, Senior Advisor to the HUD Secretary and guiding 
hand for the design teams, was essential, and his vision was also innovative. RBD explored the 
role of design and the methods of design to address major social and environmental challenges. 
Most significantly, RBD presented a compelling vision for regional, evidence-based interven-
tions – that is, “thinking big” – where current practices and players constrain those interven-
tions.
3. RBD’s unique public-philanthropic funding and management departed from traditional 
federal solicitations typical of the infrastructure projects proposed. The leveraged funds and 
guidance provided by key philanthropic partners was a third primary input, particularly from 
the Rockefeller Foundation, which had been leading work in resilience since well before RBD, 
and the other ongoing funders of community-based organizations in the region. The JPB Foun-
dation’s involvement in resilience topics and competition strategies was also critical, as was the 
knowledge of local community groups provided by other partners
4. RBD administrative team staff’s efficiency and grit played a key role in the face of tight 
schedules and with little to no pre-existing management plan. Their individual dedication and 
collective endurance ensured that details were addressed.
5. The self-interest and mission of the local officials and community groups and citizens that 
participated was key and, in most cases, these groups supported the RBD teams’ development 
throughout Phase I.
xiT H E  E VA L U A T I O N  O F  T H E  D E S I G N  C O M P E T I T I O N  O F  R E B U I L D  B Y  D E S I G N
6. The perseverance, goodwill and fundamental creativity of the design teams was an obvious 
contributing support to RBD’s completion despite the meager resources provided by the prizes 
for participation in the competition and the often minimal familiarity with either the nature of 
the eventual implementation awards or an understanding of the scope of expectations at the 
project’s onset.
7. RBD’s vision attracted broad academic and professional interest, particularly in the archi-
tectural and engineering design community. This interest was critical for providing ongoing 
attention and ensuring an ongoing creative motive for the design teams’ participation.
8. RBD demonstrated many of the best aspects of a design competition even though several 
stakeholders described it as not representative of design competitions. RBD produced a tre-
mendous volume of juried design analysis and plans whose value far exceeds the resources that 
were made available. RBD also improved upon traditional design competitions by introduc-
ing research, public engagement and practical implementation stages, often in collaboration 
across the teams – three key opportunities and one framework that are uncommon in tradi-
tional competitions. 
9. RBD demonstrated innovative departures from traditional federal practice in the execution 
of the competition through its unique public-philanthropic partnership. In this partnership, 
foundations contributed resources for the competition’s management and team prizes, and 
federal resources provided implementation awards to recipient communities. 
10. RBD staff produced an   organizational structure that managed the detailed tasks with no pre-
existing blueprint. RBD’s unique management structure existed parallel to, but separate from, 
the traditional federal grant solicitation and award processes that are typically burdensome, 
highly regulated and lengthy. 
11. Lack of precedent and preexisting plans for RBD led to changing and growing requirements 
for deliverables, participation in activities and, in some cases, reconfigured teams. While RBD 
responded to this by providing multiple channels for design teams to access information, there 
were increased opportunities for communications slippages and varying interpretations of de-
liverables and of the post-jury award criteria.  
12. The intensity of the compressed timeframe was taxing, as noted by all stakeholder groups. 
In ten months, RBD activities were undertaken across competition, research, design develop-
ment, jurisdictional negotiations, media outreach and community engagement – a process that 
typically would take a minimum of two years. 
13. The design teams’ resource limitations exacerbated RBD’s intensity. The individual teams 
spent well more than the allotted funds, typically at a magnitude of three to six times over  
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14. The inclusion of community engagement and outreach in a design competition with its typical 
constraints was innovative and ambitious. As noted in the literature regarding design competi-
tions, this activity is generally omitted altogether – which deters later implementation.
15. The time constraints were particularly difficult for many community groups because of the 
rush for support but also because of the concern that long-term engagement and a discus-
sion of needs in the communities would not be possible. Despite this, most community groups 
willingly participated with an understanding of the potential benefits that would come from 
award. The primary exception to this sentiment was members of citizens’ groups concerned 
with the execution of Sandy recovery efforts unrelated to RBD.
16. Most design teams relied on tried-and-true techniques for community engagement given the 
time and resource constraints. However, a few activities were particularly inventive within the 
variety of RBD community engagement events, workshops, charrettes, and outreach activities. 
The “Scale It Up” events--designed to promote RBD and resilience awareness--were particu-
larly notable. Online and social media engagement strategies the design teams employed in 
reaching community groups and general citizens were also creative, though only partially suc-
cessful due to the time and resource constraints.  
17. Ultimately, the community groups are mostly interested in the final outcomes of awards and 
the potential to continue engagement that will inform the designs while benefitting the com-
munities. This sentiment was echoed by members of the media, who noted that benchmarks 
and actualized projects will be the primary interest among the general public.
18. RBD’s inclusion of specific implementation planning and feasibility requirements is an inno-
vative approach to design competitions. Typical competitions for actual developments prede-
termine all of the implementation issues prior to issuing a call, while curated competitions do 
not address the implementation issues at all.
19. RBD set out a novel relationship among federal, state and local governments in which federal 
resources were used in a way that meant national thinkers could address local problems. Sig-
nificant efforts were made on the part of the core RBD partners to introduce, negotiate and 
come to resolution on funding streams and appropriations between these public entities.  
20. The nature of HUD funding regulations and protocols for the eventual award has proven to 
be a significant challenge in both obvious and more profound ways. The immediate challenge 
from the use of CDBG-DR comes from the specific nature of the funds’ obligation and sub-
sequent implementation. Typically, CDBG-DR grantees propose their own activities for HUD’s 
approval and funding. In RBD, HUD played an obviously heavier role in helping to define the ac-
tivities. Though flexible compared to almost all other federal disaster fund programs, CDBG-DR 
still involves regulated processes that prescribe any outlays from the federal government.
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21. Related procedural constraints included determining:
• the appropriate type of cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses
• the eligible grantees’ individual procurement regulations after receipt of funds that may 
preclude sole-source contracting with the original design teams
• remaining national and local regulatory assessments and  approvals 
• the persistent demands among the local and state governments for other Sandy-related 
recovery efforts that may compete with RBD projects for attention and resources.
RBD revealed opportunities that future similar endeavors may take on as additional challenges, such 
as: increasing popular awareness of resilience; instituting networks among communities for infor-
mation sharing; establishing long-term collaborations between jurisdictions beyond specific RBD 
projects to identify shared problems and early political buy-in; and institutionalizing federal funding 
for innovative regional capital projects. These findings provide critical lessons for forming plans for 
RBD’s Phase II (which calls for implementation of the winning projects in New York and New Jersey 
after grant awards) and for replicating the RBD vision.
Recommendations 
1. Even after funding agreements are made, continued investment is needed during the imple-
mentation phase to ensure that RBD’s current design projects remain innovative, that commu-
nities remain engaged, and that the wealth of knowledge gained from Phase I is gathered and 
sustained. For individual design teams, the transition from concept to project is still occurring. 
Similarly, other priorities and obligations that state and local authorities face may compete with 
and impede the long-term attention needed for RBD projects.  
2. Replication of RBD processes is possible in different post-disaster conditions as well as in 
contexts with resilience challenges that have not experienced recent disasters. Some RBD 
activities – such as convening research advisors and websites – can be ongoing, fundamen-
tal resources to be deployed in other scenarios, while others – such as the solicitation and 
jury, timeframe and resources, and support partners – need adjustment. Still others – such as 
leaders, champions and partners – are specific to RBD’s current context and would need to be 
replicated for each scenario. However, CDBG-DR implementation award funds would not be 
possible in scenarios that have not experienced disasters.
3. Future or similar efforts should pay particular attention early on to setting the award value and 
assessing the local political, financial and regulatory terrain in order to anticipate final outputs 
clearly. RBD has been unique in the world of design competition and resilience planning in two 
other noteworthy ways: the dollar value and source of the RBD awards. Both of these traits 
were highly influenced by the post-Sandy New York context and have played a significant role in 
motivating – and in some cases, thwarting – stakeholders. Securing the financial resources and 
anticipating or preventing local political challenges are both critical considerations for future 
replication of the model.
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While the RBD projects remain “castles in the sky” for the very near future according to several informants, 
RBD’s successful completion of its expected processes suggest that design thinking is an innovative strategy 
for resilience challenges. Several municipalities involved in RBD projects are now including resilience in their 
formal planning processes. RBD-affiliated community groups have expressed a deeper awareness of local resil-
ience challenges. The architecture, engineering and planning community is paying new attention to resilience 
strategies due in part to RBD’s well-placed professional media. All these achievements were documented 
outputs of Phase I alone. 
At the time of the evaluation, the individual projects’ immediate fates were yet to be determined. This means 
that RBD’s most important output was conceptual – because it showed that regional discussion of ways to 
address problems that affect multiple jurisdictions through design is possible. With few exceptions among 
the respondents and other sources for this evaluation, there has been nearly unanimous support for this 
vision. RBD gives hope that large national problems such as resilience can be addressed with multidisciplinary 
knowledge, through design thinking, and with federal oversight.  
As one design team lead summarized, RBD lets stakeholders imagine possibilities when the opportunity for 
“investments of large resources for big ideas is simply non-existent in the US now.” Despite its focus on Phase 
I alone, this formative evaluation found evidence that RBD moved the resilience boulder up the national hill.
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1
Introduction
On the evening of October 29, 2012, Hurricane 
Sandy made landfall in southern New Jersey, with 
impacts felt across more than a dozen states. The 
storm battered the East Coast, particularly the 
densely populated New York and New Jersey coasts, 
with heavy rain, strong winds and record storm 
surges. During Sandy’s immediate aftermath, more 
than 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary 
shelters, and more than 8.5 million utility customers 
lost power. The storm flooded numerous roads 
and tunnels, blocked transportation corridors and 
deposited extensive debris along the coastline.  
Superstorm Sandy served as a reminder not only 
of possible future events, but also of our recent 
national history in relation to disaster. Prior to the 
Federal Disaster Act of 1950, the federal govern-
ment played little to no role in assisting communities 
or individuals after emergencies. Survivors relied on 
charity and relief efforts from the American Red 
Cross or local public and non-profit entities (Mittler, 
1996). Increased advocacy and incremental appro-
priations following subsequent disasters led to the 
passage of the Federal Disaster Relief Act in 1974, 
and the ensuing creation of FEMA, which was given 
responsibilities and staff formerly housed in the De-
partment of Defense, Department of Commerce and 
HUD (Comerio, 1998).  
During the next decade, federal appropriations for 
disaster assistance (in services, grants and loans) 
“increased by a factor of nearly ten times the growth 
of the value of disaster losses” (May and Williams, 
1986).  The increased investment was based on the 
premise that survivors needed to return to their pre-
emergency conditions quickly – though not neces-
sarily to a better condition. The Presidential directive 
to establish a National Preparedness Goal was issued 
December 17, 2003, though it took eight years to 
produce (DHS, 2011). It took Sandy to lead federal 
officials to realize that massive relief and recovery 
efforts can simply not be sustained.
The subsequent recovery efforts led by the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
as outlined in the federal National Disaster Recovery 
Framework, were multi-pronged and timely. Beyond 
providing resources and support  and, in some cases, 
performing direct physical work to assist the San-
dy-affected communities, the collective response 
also looked beyond short- and mid-term recovery 
needs. Simply rebuilding what had existed prior to 
the natural disaster, it was argued, would be inad-
equate. With the increased likelihood of additional 
extreme storm events precipitated by the multiple 
and interlaced effects of global climate change, 
recovery would need to account for future risks. In 
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short, recovery would need to be resilient. As HUD 
Secretary Shaun Donovan noted in the Task Force’s 
public report: “More than ever, it is critical that when 
we build for the future, we do so in a way that makes 
communities more resilient to emerging challenges” 
(Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 2013a). 
As one tool among many in the Hurricane Sandy 
Rebuilding Task Force’s kit, HUD launched Rebuild 
by Design (RBD) with two goals in mind. The first 
goal was identifying a new product that would go 
beyond tradition and offer innovative approaches 
for preparing the region most affected by Sandy 
for future disasters through architectural design, 
regional planning and environmental engineering. 
The second goal involved a new process for tapping 
that product innovation. It called for integrating 
public, philanthropic and private sector resources 
and knowledge with community participation in a 
design competition to ensure efficient execution.
The evaluation team developed a thorough un-
derstanding of RBD’s evolution and reviewed the 
history of design competition methods. Its investi-
gation focused on the processes of RBD’s formation 
and competition stages across four parameters or 
“domains of interest”.
• Intervention: the inputs, including the vision, 
resources, motivations and actions of key stake-
holders. 
• Competition: the specific steps and sequence 
of activities and preliminary outputs associated 
with the RBD model as executed.  
• Participation: the involvement of relevant 
community voices, as a separate area of interest 
based on its importance in the literature.
• Implementation: the challenges associated with 
future implementation, particularly govern-
mental (regulatory and political) and financial 
(resource limitations).
With the increased likelihood of additional 
extreme storm events precipitated by the 
multiple and interlaced effects of global 
climate change, recovery would need to 
account for future risks. In short, recovery 
would need to be resilient.
FIGURE 1. RBD hypothetical theory of change
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Three primary sources of data were tapped for this 
evaluation. 
• Documents: formal reports available both publi-
cally and privately as well as informal communi-
cations and records.
• Event observations: made at community 
outreach events and meetings to which the eval-
uation team was given access. 
• Interviews: with a non-representative sample of 
individuals from stakeholder groups.
Ultimately, the evaluation team was able to interview 
113 individuals in all of the stakeholder groups during 
the six-week data collection timeframe. It also 
reviewed over 12,000 documents and recorded ob-
servations from 17 community and public events.
Data collection instruments were structured around 
the four domains of interest and their respective 
evaluation questions. Using all of the data collected, 
the evaluation team documented common patterns 
across the key domains of interest and noted points 
of contention among data sources. These were 
then mapped in relation to the domains of interest 
to determine findings and responses to the evalua-
tion questions. The findings presented in this report 
include documentation of key facts, dates and activi-
ties, as well as the descriptions of responses, noting 
informant biases and sample response biases where 
applicable.   
For this analysis, it was found useful to generate a 
model of RBD’s central hypotheses about how its 
goals would be reached. This encompassed the indi-
vidual inputs, activities and outputs that were noted 
in the evaluation as well as expected outcomes, ob-
jectives and goals – typically referred to as a logic 
model. Subsequently, the team was able to map 
out the expected sequence and relationship among 
them through a causal pathway referred to as a 
theory of change. A basic depiction of RBD’s hypo-
thetical theory of change is provided in Figure 1. 
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Intervention inputs
The first of the four critical domains of interest in 
this evaluation is the intervention itself. This means 
looking at the vision and formation of the RBD 
concept as an actionable model, including all of 
the aspects related to the evolution of its concept, 
the nature of its model with its expected goals and 
expected outcomes, and the key inputs required to 
shape the model, including the motivations and roles 
of key stakeholders. This does not include an assess-
ment of the individual or collective activities and 
their outputs, which are covered in later chapters. 
Questions for the subjects included:
• What other post-Sandy recovery strategies are 
in effect? Which were considered during the RBD 
concept development? Was RBD ever consid-
ered a strategy in relation to others? How does 
the competition differ from traditional infra-
structure request for proposals (RFPs)? What 
other political and environmental contexts have 
surrounded Sandy recovery?
• What was the seed for RBD? Who planted it? 
How did the concept evolve to its present form? 
The goals and activities? How was the problem 
statement conceived? 
• Do any outcome or performance targets exist? 
How are these articulated?
• How were different partners assembled? What 
formal and informal agreements exist? What are 
groups’ funding obligations?
2.1. Findings
Based on the review of all inputs to the RBD process, 
the evaluation found the following seven key 
supports as being critical to the RBD intervention. 
Finding 1:  HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan’s leader-
ship and the commitment of CDBG-DR funds were 
critical inputs. Ultimately, the size of that resource 
commitment proved to be a critical motivator. HUD’s 
innovative use of statutory authority for allocating 
CDBG-DR departed from the traditional method 
of fund outlays (i.e., formula allocations based on 
estimates of damage and unmet needs). In turn, 
the use of these funds to implement RBD-designed 
regional infrastructure projects departed from tradi-
tional activities for which these funds had been used 
in post-disaster scenarios (e.g. rebuilding of individ-
ual homes or public buildings or economic develop-
ment activities).
Finding 2:  The charisma and vision of Henk Ovink, 
Senior Advisor to the HUD Secretary and guiding 
hand for the design teams, was essential, and his 
vision was also innovative. RBD explored the role 
of design and the methods of design to address 
major social and environmental challenges. Most 
significantly, RBD presented a compelling vision 
for regional, evidence-based interventions – that is, 
“thinking big” – where current practices and players 
constrain those interventions.
2
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Finding 3:  RBD’s unique public-philanthropic 
funding and management departed from tradi-
tional federal solicitations typical of the infrastruc-
ture projects proposed. The leveraged funds and 
guidance provided by key philanthropic partners was 
a third primary input, particularly from the Rockefell-
er Foundation which has been leading work in resil-
ience since well before RBD and the other ongoing 
funders of community-based organizations in the 
region. The interest of JPB Foundation in resilience 
topics and competition strategies was also critical, 
along with the knowledge of local community groups 
provided by other partners.
Finding 4:  RBD administrative team staff’s ef-
ficiency and grit played a key role in the face of 
tight schedules and with little to no pre-existing 
management plan. Their individual dedication and 
collective endurance ensured that details were 
addressed.
Finding 5:  The self-interest and mission of the 
local officials and community groups and citizens 
that participated was key and, in most cases, these 
groups supported the RBD teams’ development 
throughout Phase I.
Finding 6:  The perseverance, goodwill and funda-
mental creativity of the design teams was an obvious 
contributing support to RBD’s completion despite 
the meager resources provided by the prizes for par-
ticipation in the competition and the often minimal 
familiarity with either the nature of the eventual 
implementation awards or an understanding of the 
scope of expectations at the project’s onset.
Finding 7:  RBD’s vision attracted broad academic 
and professional interest, particularly in the archi-
tectural and engineering design community. This 
interest was critical for providing ongoing attention 
and ensuring an ongoing creative motive for the 
design teams’ participation.
Early in RBD’s conceptualization, inputs identi-
fied as necessary and critical included the over-
arching model, the involvement and commitment 
of talented designers and related parties, and the 
funding for both the team competition and project 
implementation.1 However, in its execution, more 
detailed requirements for the inputs emerged, such 
as defining the “model” as composed of vision, goals 
and work plan, and defining talent to mean a wide 
variety of involved stakeholders. Further, analysis 
of key sources uncovered one additional key input: 
leadership. In total, the evaluation team identified 
six key inputs:
• leadership: leadership of central RBD figures in 
government and philanthropy
• resources: financial and knowledge resources 
provided for the model’s realization
• vision: RBD’s central vision for change
• goals: goals, targets and expected outcomes for 
that vision 
• management plans: management work plan for 
integrating inputs and executing activities 
• motivations: the motivations and roles of stake-
holder groups for participating in the RBD enter-
prise.
The following discussion details the individual inputs 
and provides evidence for the findings.  
1  The significance of these inputs was mirrored in the selection of 
themes for three “design debates” which accompanied the public roll-
out of RBD’s Stage 3 that were sponsored by the Syracuse University 
School of Architecture held on February 19, March 5, and March 19 on, 
respectively, “process,” “talent,” and “funding”. 
A central early input and, in fact, the 
driving force of the work itself came in 
the form of leadership of two individuals, 
HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan and Special 
Advisor Henk Ovink,  and two primary 
organizations, HUD and the Rockefeller 
Foundation. 
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2.2. Leadership 
A central early input and, in fact, the driving force 
of the work itself came in the form of leadership of 
two individuals, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan and 
Special Advisor Henk Ovink, and two primary or-
ganizations, HUD and the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Secretary Donovan identified the need for an inter-
vention such as RBD, and ensured that the resources 
were made available. HUD staff assisting Donovan, 
starting with Laurel Blatchford but primarily including 
Scott Davis and Marion McFadden, played critical 
roles through the execution of RBD as intermediaries 
between federal regulations and Ovink’s conceptual 
vision. With this team and, later, staff from the HUD 
Office of Economic Resilience, Donovan identified 
CDBG-DR funds for RBD’s goals. 
Donovan has publically credited Henk Ovink, his 
Special Advisor on loan from the Dutch Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment for the RBD 
vision (Shorto, 2014). Ovink’s infrastructure expertise 
with the Delta Works projects in the Netherlands, 
his connections in the global design community, and 
his exposure to US infrastructure needs through in-
volvement in efforts such as the 2008 post-Hurricane 
Katrina “Dutch Dialogues” positioned him profession-
ally for the tasks at hand. Ovink served as an ongoing 
mentor to and “generator of goodwill” among the 
design teams, a driving force for RBD’s outputs, and a 
public face for RBD’s vision. Both Donovan and Ovink 
were repeatedly brought up by all stakeholder groups 
as being central drivers of RBD. 
In addition to the resources unleashed at HUD by 
Donovan’s commitment to Ovink’s vision, the collective 
body of knowledge, networks and financial resources 
put forth by the Rockefeller Foundation for the effort 
have been notable. The opportunity presented by RBD 
extended well beyond investment and also placed the 
Rockefeller Foundation in the role of champion for the 
effort in the philanthropic community as well as key 
partner to HUD. The two entities codified this relation-
ship in a memorandum of understanding (HUD and 
the Rockefeller Foundation, 2013).
2.3. Resources 
The funds for the design competition itself were, 
of course, critical to making the RBD vision even 
remotely feasible, given HUD’s resource limitations. 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s commitment of more 
than $3 million supported the design team activi-
ties ($1 million) as well as the RBD project manager 
and supporting partners’ roles in enacting the man-
agement logistics ($2.07 million).2 The Rockefeller 
Foundation was instrumental in enlisting philan-
thropic organizations to support complementary 
efforts.3 This effort resulted in an additional $1 million 
for the design team efforts (which allowed for the 
selection of ten design teams with $200,000 awards 
for each) and other funds for evaluation and stipends 
to community organizations involved in engagement 
activities on behalf of the design teams. 
Critical among these groups were the JPB Founda-
tion, Deutsche Bank Americas Foundation (DB), 
Hearst Foundations and Surdna Foundation. The 
Community Foundation of New Jersey also served 
as a clearinghouse of philanthropic funds through its 
New Jersey Recovery Fund (NJRF), which included 
many other funders with interest in RBD’s activities, 
such as the Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation (Philan-
thropy New York, 2013). Aside from their financial 
resources, these organizations also gave critical 
feedback to the RBD team throughout Phase I (MAS, 
2013).4 As thought partners, their understanding of 
local community organizations in the region was 
instrumental in setting up a separate pool of funds 
through the support partners to cover those organi-
zations’ involvement. 
However, the largest pool of funding came early 
on, when HUD identified and explicitly committed 
2 The Rockefeller Foundation Grant Agreements (2013). The New York 
University Institute for Public Knowledge (IPK) received $596,134, 
the Community Foundation of New Jersey’s Recovery Fund received 
$250,000 in support of the RBD project manager, and $1,223,866 was 
granted to the MAS of New York to be shared with the RPA and VAI.
3 In New York City alone, dozens of philanthropic organizations contrib-
uted millions of dollars to Sandy recovery. 
4 This feedback was somewhat anticipated and planned for by the RBD 
support partners.
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CDBG-DR funding to incentivize implementation 
of winning projects and proposals. Identified by 
Donovan early in the RBD conceptualization, the 
legal authority to set aside these funds was estab-
lished over the course of Phase I. The exact amount, 
as described in the original published request for 
qualifications (RFQ) and responses to subsequent 
questions, was not planned to “be known until Fall 
2014, following updated damage estimates and 
allocation(s) of subsequent tranches of CDBG-DR,” 
out of the “approximately $15 billion for [CDBG-
DR]… for disasters in 2011, 2012, 2013” provided 
in the Congressional appropriations. Early on, 
however, HUD expected “a significant portion of the 
funds remaining following that allocation(s) [to] be 
dedicated to incentivizing the implementation of 
winning design solutions” (HUD, 2013b). 
An innovation in policy operations itself, HUD also 
committed staff and management time to RBD in 
addition to future CDBG-DR outlays. This commit-
ment of resources was sizeable, and included: i) 
managing the philanthropic funds for design teams; 
ii) designing and administering the competition; 
iii) establishing the selection committee for design 
teams with task force members; iv) identifying the 
jury members; v) developing a preliminary system to 
manage the competition; vi) monitoring the budget; 
vii) updating the Rockefeller Foundation, other foun-
dations and the general public about RBD activities; 
and viii) soliciting those other foundations. These 
resources were critical inputs to the RBD model. To 
a much lesser extent, the in-kind contributions of 
other federal agencies in the form of general meteo-
rological, geological and oceanic data, related staff 
review time, technical assistance time for a few key 
staff (particularly from the ACE), and other research 
assistance was also provided.
2.4. Vision
Though less visible than individuals and money, the 
concept of RBD served as a key input for the model in 
that it preceded the effort and enabled additional ac-
tivities and outputs. Other components of the model 
have evolved, but the vision of harnessing design for 
regional resilience challenges has remained relative-
ly consistent. The problem, as the vision articulates, 
is not one of simple Sandy rebuilding and recovery. 
Rather, it involves preparing for future Sandies and 
as Nancy Kete, Managing Director for the Rock-
efeller Foundation’s global work on resilience, 
noted, “We don’t know what the future holds.” The 
challenge of resilience, then, is in finding innovative 
ways to recover and prepare that go beyond a “cut 
and paste” response similar to historical responses 
to disaster (Ovink, 2013a). 
The designers of RBD approached this uncer-
tainty by embracing a less direct process than 
those typical of post-disaster responses. Many 
observers have shown that the imperatives of 
recovery reduce opportunities to imagine what a 
more resilient city (or other system) would look 
like – that is, recovery is often simply rebuilding, 
and the same features that reduced resilience may 
be replicated. RBD’s vision was to move resilience 
to the foreground and to do so in a purposefully 
ambiguous way in order to allow for interactions 
between geographies and topics. 
The RBD designers embraced the “fuzziness” of the 
ideas, keeping both “resilient” and “region” unsettled 
and subjective terms. Ovink used the analogy of the 
“sabbatical detour” to distinguish the RBD process 
The problem, as the vision articulates, is 
not one of simple Sandy rebuilding and 
recovery. Rather, it involves preparing 
for future Sandies and as Nancy Kete, 
Managing Director for the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s global work on resilience, 
noted, “We don’t know what the future 
holds.”
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from typical recovery efforts, with milestones in 
the detour meant to foster interaction between 
the design team and the community in which it is 
embedded, in order to yield a product superior to 
that produced by a “regular process” (Ovink, 2013b).
Although fuzziness was meant to infer openness 
(and thus creativity), the RBD process also called for 
enough engagement with science and the public, 
starting with the visioning process, to make these 
concepts more concrete. Ovink operationalized this 
process of infusing concrete community and scien-
tific contexts of the often open-ended competition 
process into an actionable design competition with 
the following activities:
• Comprehensive regional analysis of mitigation 
challenges facing the Sandy-impacted region
• List of key projects where Federal and other 
(state/local/private) funds can be used to rebuild 
in a more resilient manner
• Implementation of a selection of these projects 
through CDBG-DR funding
• Collaborative process with Task Force Agencies, 
State, local and tribal partners for securing 
support for successful implementation of inno-
vative designs for resilient rebuilding
• Federal strategy for national approach of regional 
resilient rebuilding (Ovink, 2013b). 
This early vision of RBD, as articulated before its June 
2013 launch, was purposefully not grounded in the 
realities of US disaster recovery funding or federal 
government processes, particularly in relation to 
state and local governments. Rather, it was meant to 
provide an alternative to those existing practices and 
constraints.
Thus design became a key component of this vision’s 
innovation in both the product and this alternative 
process. To this point, Ovink noted the need for a 
different professional way of thinking that did not leap 
immediately to “problem solving”. The added value 
that designers can create for society goes beyond 
the attractive and functional design of the actual 
physical intervention. Good design can help drive the 
cohesion, sustainability and earning capacity of the 
community at large.” With this in mind, the “power 
of design” became an integral and indispensable 
component of the vision. Design’s prominence in the 
vision would later be affirmed by both design teams – 
with a member of one of the teams defining RBD as a 
“rare opportunity for design to lead.” Another stake-
holder noted that traditional practice in disaster 
recovery was to “act like there’s no time to design,” 
but RBD was “piloting how thoughtful design can be 
used efficiently.” 
RBD’s model of competition was originally envi-
sioned as staged phases with several teams (5 to 
10) working collaboratively in analyzing the region’s 
issues but designing separately to yield projects 
that would be selected for implementation on their 
own merits. The RBD model would depart from tra-
ditional design competitions in one very significant 
way: even though focused on a specific region and 
its general recovery challenges, the program for the 
competition was largely open-ended. The RBD com-
petition was structured to pick qualified designers 
with teams of experts who would then define the 
problems in question. As one stakeholder confirmed, 
Ovink’s “main point was that they shouldn’t issue an 
RFP because there’s not enough information, the 
scale of the region is so great, and the interventions 
so diverse that the focus should be on getting teams 
to do this work, rather than having government do 
the research and issuing the RFP.”  
Thus, from its start, RBD was neutral with regard to 
program:
• four focus areas: coastal communities, high-den-
sity urban environments, ecological and water 
body networks, and a catch-all category of un-
identified or unexpected focus
Design became a key component of this 
vision’s innovation in both the product and 
this alternative process.
T H E  E VA L U A T I O N  O F  T H E  D E S I G N  C O M P E T I T I O N  O F  R E B U I L D  B Y  D E S I G N10
• site: the most-affected and most-vulnerable 
areas of the Sandy-affected region
• scope: no project cost maxima provided until 
informal ranges were given in Stage 3 (community 
engagement) (HUD 2013a; Hurricane Sandy Re-
building Task Force, 2013b).  
 
Combined with the lack of a clear project “prize” 
beyond the design team stipends, many design 
stakeholders wondered whether RBD could be clas-
sified as a competition.5 This ambiguity was purpose-
ful and designed to spur innovation. The intention of 
the design competition – to produce projects that 
would be judged on their own merits – deviated 
significantly from the norm, which usually calls for 
winnowing teams down to a winner. 
The RBD vision for the design competition also 
departed from traditional practice by integrating 
collaborative research and community engagement 
squarely within the competition rather than as pre-
existing conditions or post-award requirements. RBD 
provided intensive research and outreach assistance 
to formulate project problems and develop design 
solutions. In playing the role of project developer, 
RBD also helped coordinate local political outreach 
and required teams to engage local citizenry and 
community organizations. The level of resources and 
local government involvement differed markedly 
from other development endeavors. Though such 
5 There is some evidence that the use of the term “competition” was 
primarily one of expedience in terms of both federal protocols and of 
generating interest in the professional design community.
ideas have been featured in other competitions, the 
RBD application combined with the other innova-
tions noted above sketched a new model for design 
prizes. The expectation of potential implementation 
became a key element of the vision and shaped sig-
nificant management and design team activities in 
Stage 3 (community engagement).
In sum, RBD’s vision was to i) innovate, ii) use design 
as the channel for innovation, iii) develop a com-
petition that ensured talented designers would 
be enlisted with broad room to maneuver, and iv) 
alter the nature of competition with activities that 
required the design projects to be informed by 
science, desirable for recipient communities and 
tenable for implementation. 
However, some evaluation respondents criticized the 
RBD vision and its significant departures from com-
parable processes. For example, some local groups 
questioned the need to innovate when existing tra-
ditional recovery strategies such as home rebuilding 
had not been successfully rolled out. Several infor-
mants, including research advisors and other stake-
holders in the region, questioned the focus on design 
as the chosen conduit, given the number of other 
community needs. 
Stakeholders from the design world, including the 
teams themselves, expressed angst over the tension 
– “innovation versus clarity” – that the broad terms 
forced, leading some to wish that specific sites or 
problems had been designated a priori to allow for 
“focused creativity.” For example, some members of 
the design community speculated that a “design task 
force” to establish problem statements and select 
sites for individual competitions could yield the same 
or even improved output. Most critically, several 
stakeholders described the vision as “top-down” 
and “not based in reality” despite the attempts to 
integrate community engagement and feasibility 
within the competition. Almost universally, however, 
respondents found the overall vision “refreshing” 
and “appealing.” 
The RBD vision for the design competition 
also departed from traditional practice 
by integrating collaborative research and 
community engagement squarely within 
the competition rather than as preexisting 
conditions or post-award requirements.
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2.5. Goals, targets and 
expected outcomes 
As discussed earlier, RBD developers explicitly 
chose not to define a problem statement by either 
geography (e.g. a specific site) or program (e.g. 
storm surge protection or wetland conservation). 
This meant they set no quantitative environmental 
or social targets against which a design opportu-
nity could be measured. Further, the scope of the 
final project budget and the competition award (or 
contract) value were unknown at the offset. 
The same purposeful ambiguity is noted in the 
formal documentation of RBD’s goals, targets and 
outcomes. Specifically, RBD’s developers listed two 
key goals to capture their expectations for innova-
tions in product and process:
• promote innovation by developing regionally 
scalable but locally contextual solutions that 
increase resilience in the region
• implement selected proposals with public and 
private funding.
In essence, there were no identifiable measures, 
typical CDBG-DR monitoring plans or resilience per-
formance outcomes beyond the mission of generat-
ing and implementing innovative designs as called 
for in the broad RBD mission. This lack of outcome 
specifics was purposeful because, according to 
Ovink, setting them would have defined the scope 
of the project too early in the process. The inability 
to openly describe the CDBG-DR outlays for the 
projects also made setting terms for outcomes 
untenable. This intentional ambiguity informally 
earned RBD the moniker of “vague by design” from 
some of the management team.  
According to some informants, having unspeci-
fied outcomes allowed unorthodox and potentially 
unpopular ideas such as resident relocation to be 
considered. For other respondents, particularly 
those familiar with traditional development practices 
and policy negotiations, the lack of goals was more 
of a concern. They translated the lack of goals as 
potentially leading to less transparency, fewer ac-
tionable opportunities and a sense that RBD would 
speak primarily to a unique audience in the architec-
tural profession. One respondent noted that having a 
more operational set of “RBD guiding principles” for 
the process could have been helpful in overcoming 
the goals’ ambiguity.
2.6. Management plans
The establishment and later execution of man-
agement plans for operationalizing the vision and 
preparing all of the stakeholders for the activities 
provided integral input to the RBD activities that 
played a role in final outputs. There were two key 
management areas covered by the plans – those 
established for RBD in particular and those for the 
traditional operational requirements of public solici-
tations, such as CDBG-DR, from which RBD’s organi-
zation and management plans departed.
In its earliest phases, the management plan for RBD 
was primarily based on staging the vision rather 
than comprehensive organization for managing 
critical paths. Plans made prior to the release of the 
RFQ were based on: i) the original vision for stages 
proposed by Ovink, ii) general discussions held during 
the May 8 Hurricane Sandy Task Force Resilience 
Incentive Prize Workshop and iii) assistance that the 
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) offered from 
May through August for executing solicitation and 
reviews for design competitions. Many stakeholders 
noted that this last guidance provided critical insight 
into the logistics of competition management as 
There were no identifiable measures, 
typical CDBG-DR monitoring plans 
or resilience performance outcomes 
beyond the mission of generating and 
implementing innovative designs as called 
for in the broad RBD mission. 
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well as how those processes were allowable within 
federal solicitation regulations. However, the NEA’s 
assistance focused only on Stage 1 (team selection), 
and not subsequent activities. 
The NYU Institute for Public Knowledge (IPK) was 
tasked with developing and executing a manage-
ment plan for the research process that would 
expose the design teams to critical research and 
scholars in the region, as well as guide preliminary 
engagement with communities. The goal of the plan 
was to help the design teams ultimately identify 
three to five design objectives in the region. Sam 
Carter, then with IPK, developed several work plans 
for Stage 2 (research). He worked with the RBD team 
that defined key benchmarks that would later be lo-
gistically executed with the assistance of the project 
manager, Amy Chester, and to a lesser extent, the 
other support partners. Though conceptually staged, 
the logistical plans were not fully prepared until 
Chester’s hire (discussed in more detail in Section 
3.2). At this point in Stage 2 and given the urgency 
of events and demands, planning often involved 
informal discussion between Carter and Chester.
For Stage 3 (community engagement), the manage-
ment plan continued to evolve, though with more 
explicit documentation of short-term work plans. The 
Municipal Arts Society (MAS) noted that it “inherited 
the transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3” from IPK, 
though IPK staff served as design team liaisons. 
The three partners – MAS, Regional Plan Associa-
tion (RPA) and Van Alen Institute (VAI), commonly 
referred to as the “troika” – established principles for 
the design and implementation of RBD that deter-
mined their specific roles and plans, namely: trans-
parency and inclusivity, integration and comprehen-
siveness, and enduring impact (RPA et al., 2013a; 
2013b). One funder explained that support partners 
were meant to “provide the glue” for design teams 
administratively in the early months. MAS was 
charged with financial and legal administration, but 
many of the key work tasks involved all three organi-
zations. Of the 24 deliverables listed in the final work 
plan in August, one-third were assigned to “all” orga-
nizations. Despite the original work plan and desig-
nated roles, partners found that their responsibilities 
remained vaguely defined until the hiring of Chester 
as RBD’s project manager during the first month of 
the groups’ formal collaboration.
Once on board in mid-August, Chester took the 
various conceptual and operational work plans from 
the RFQ, IPK and the three support partners. She 
began defining schedules and the logistical activi-
ties required for events and benchmarks, and set up 
a common communications protocol to oversee all 
of the support partners as well as report to the core 
RBD partners and, as needed, other stakeholders. 
She also incorporated changing requirements from 
RBD partners for events and deliverables, including 
calendar changes and new needs identified by design 
teams. 
New needs included having design teams propose 
individual work plans, as well as instituting reporting 
requirements and deadlines for the support partners 
and design teams at the onset of both Stages 2 
and 3. These were best articulated in biweekly 
memoranda for the design teams and weekly phone 
and email communications with the support partners 
documented as “liaison digests” – concepts which 
Chester’s added to the original management plans. 
Her project management capacity was somewhat 
constrained by these pre-existing frameworks and 
with the established organizations and their grant-
defined roles. Combined with the intense timeframe 
Combined with the intense timeframe by 
which RBD and the design teams were 
intended to produce deliverables, however, 
the formal management plans essentially 
became background guidelines – thereby, 
implicitly requiring project manager, 
Amy Chester, and the support partners to 
develop management plans on the go.
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by which RBD and the design teams were intended 
to produce deliverables, however, the formal man-
agement plans essentially became background 
guidelines – thereby, implicitly requiring Chester and 
the support partners to develop management plans 
on the go.
Even beyond management plans, RBD’s innova-
tive organizational and management structure also 
differed from the typical federal expectations and 
requirements. The management structure leveraged 
local expertise from well-known organizations with 
intimate knowledge of and ties to the region.  The 
consensus among key informants across all stake-
holder groups – including federal agencies – is that 
deviating from the status quo was not necessarily a 
negative, particularly with regard to deviation from 
federal management plans. 
As many interviewees noted, the “government isn’t 
innovative.” RBD created a parallel management, or 
as Ovink described it, a “double track” structure, that 
needed to respond flexibly and “build the plane while 
it was being flown.” The management structure was 
purposefully designed to be more efficient, more 
responsive and less restricted than formalized gov-
ernment processes. Many interviewees agreed that 
“there is potential out there for using [design com-
petitions] in the world of innovation.”
However, a significant divergence from normal 
protocol was the flexible use of CDBG-DR funds – 
grants distributed by HUD to help cities, counties 
and states rebuild and recover from federal-declared 
disasters – which then led to other flexible manage-
ment of the funds. RBD’s rapid pace also meant 
that many typical federal protocols for notices and 
managing transparency occurred at atypical times in 
the process. 
Multiple interviewees cited the intense collabora-
tion between philanthropic partners and federal 
government as another notable element of RBD. 
Federal employees noted that Secretary Donovan 
has pursued relationships with philanthropic orga-
nizations in the past, but the degree and depen-
dency of the collaboration around RBD is unusual. 
It is clear that without the assistance of philan-
thropy, RBD would not have been possible. While 
the philanthropic funders’ participation with RBD 
varied, several funders made unique contributions 
to RBD strategy and functioning; some funders, for 
example, insisted on increased public participation 
through microgrants. In this way, philanthropy also 
influenced the actual design process and perhaps the 
design products as well. 
2.7. Stakeholder motivations 
and roles
Despite its management ambiguity, the vision 
presented by HUD was compelling and its leadership 
engaging. The key stakeholder groups all shared the 
overall vision but also maintained their own moti-
vations for participating. In some cases, these mo-
tivations helped them define their roles beyond the 
obvious (such as funding) while in others the roles 
were dictated by contractual agreement (support 
partners), legal restrictions (local elected officials) 
and later management exigency. The evolving moti-
vations and roles for key groups are described below, 
and a visual depiction of the RBD organizational roles 
is provided in Figure 2.
Funders
As noted earlier, support for Stage I of RBD came 
from a combination of funders. HUD provided staff 
and support to guide RBD’s evolution, and ultimately, 
will provide the CDBG-DR funds to implement the 
projects. The Rockefeller Foundation was the central 
funding and administrative group after HUD, and sup-
porting funders were the JPB Foundation, DB, Surdna 
Foundation, Hearst Foundations and the NJRF. RBD 
funders had three main roles: i)  provide financial 
support, ii) serve as advisors, providing guidance to 
the RBD management team on the process and re-
silience and iii) leverage their resources to create 
awareness about RBD in the media and among their 
relevant community constituencies. 
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The core funders were Rockefeller and HUD, with HUD 
playing a lead role in designing the RBD framework 
and writing the RFQ soliciting design teams. Both 
organizations dedicated resources and staff, secured 
buy-in from funders and political officials, and 
provided award funding. As a funder, the Rockefeller 
Foundation played and continues to play a vital lead-
ership role, funding the RBD concept, engineering 
support from additional funders, and managing re-
lationships among funders, core partners and design 
teams. One organization expressed confusion over 
its own role in RBD beyond providing funds, though 
it speculated that the fast pace of the competition 
naturally led to communication lapses.      
Several funders contacted by HUD Secretary 
Donovan indicated that having someone of the Sec-
retary’s stature approach them for funding played a 
key role in securing buy-in. Most organizations were 
motivated to participate due to their prior expressed 
interest or work in the field of disaster recovery or 
resilience. Some were motivated by a desire to use 
design as a mechanism for improving society and 
improving long-term recovery and resilience efforts. 
Of the funders especially interested in community 
participation, some expressed disappointment with 
RBD’s community participation efforts and sought 
additional resources to ensure robust community in-
volvement. Investments from partners ranged from 
basic early support in Phase 1 for the RBD “piloting” 
to interest in long-term implementation of both the 
RBD final projects and replication of the model.
Though they did not provide funds to the effort 
beyond in-kind staff and travel time, other federal 
agencies were also involved because of i) their 
interest and expertise in federal design competi-
tions, e.g. NEA, ii) their traditional role with regard to 
coastal infrastructure, e.g. Army Corps of Engineers 
(ACE), or iii) their interest in post-Sandy environ-
mental and development needs, e.g. Department 
of Transportation, Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (FEMA), National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA). These agencies 
also contributed general data and research findings 
during RBD’s early days, though calls for more 
detailed data at the project level were not answered 
on the whole.
Support partners
Four organizations were asked to help steer the 
RBD process: IPK, MAS, RPA, and VAI. IPK oversaw 
the Stage 2 research phase, while the other three 
partners were tasked with different responsibili-
ties in Stage 3, which called for the development of 
design solutions and a community/partner engage-
ment period. For the most part, support partners 
cited organizational benefits and the relationship of 
RBD to work they were already doing or were inter-
ested in doing as their primary motivations for par-
ticipating in RBD.
IPK had been active in post-Sandy research and 
felt that it was important for the university to play 
more of a role in the larger community in which 
it is situated, which encompasses the Sandy-af-
fected region. IPK’s director, Eric Klinenberg, had 
extensive knowledge of post-disaster social condi-
tions. Additionally, IPK viewed RBD as an oppor-
tunity to expand its research profile through new 
work that built on its own resilience/post-Sandy 
work around climate change and urban resilience. 
IPK also felt that RBD would be an opportunity for 
its work to develop regional significance, and that 
it could lead to future projects and interest from 
foundations that want to fund resilience/post-di-
saster work.  
The core funders were the Rockefeller 
Foundation and HUD, with HUD playing a 
lead role in designing the RBD framework 
and writing the RFQ soliciting design 
teams. Both organizations dedicated 
resources and staff, secured buy-in from 
funders and political officials, and provided 
award funding.
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MAS, RPA and VAI collectively participated in RBD 
because of their “familiarity with local community 
responses, agencies and recovery groups active 
on the ground since Sandy; connections across the 
region with stakeholders from diverse sectors … local, 
regional and international experience in fostering 
complicated design competitions … and knowledge 
and experience in developing and implementing 
public programming and engagement” (MAS et al., 
2013a). For RPA and MAS, the opportunity to forge 
new relationships between technical and community 
groups and to build regional resilience was a major 
motivating factor for participating in RBD.  
Ultimately, their respective interests mapped onto 
their roles with tasks and geographic jurisdictions 
allotted across New York City and public events 
(MAS), the States of New York, New Jersey and Con-
necticut and existing and pending planning efforts 
(RPA), and visual identity and architectural design 
(VAI) (the Rockefeller Foundation, 2013b). MAS 
also noted that part of its underlying role has been 
to “ensure that RBD doesn’t become a design-dom-
inated process.” With a strong capacity to assimi-
late and translate research as well as to solicit addi-
tional support, RPA was motivated by the potential 
planning benefits that RBD presented for the region. 
FIGURE 2. RBD organizations
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Along with its primary focus on community engage-
ment strategies, VAI took on the tasks of managing 
RBD’s visual identity and website. VAI also harnessed 
some of the lessons learned from running competi-
tions over a century. Collectively, the three support 
partners had been involved in design competitions 
to various degrees, and attempted to bring their 
different perspectives to the structure and opera-
tions established by the core partners.
Research advisors
IPK identified and selected the research advisors 
towards the end of Stage 1. They provided intellec-
tual support and guidance to RBD staff and design 
teams early on. For example, RBD staff and leader-
ship relied on research advisors to weigh in on criteria 
for evaluating design opportunities. Additionally, 
staff solicited advisors for guidance on whom to 
invite to public events or what sites in the Sandy-af-
fected region would be suitable for RBD. Their formal 
involvement concluded at the end of Stage 2. 
Advisors noted that while their roles were initially 
unclear, things crystallized as events unfolded, a 
reflection of RBD’s rapidly evolving nature and the 
varying levels of advisor time availability. For example, 
some advisors chose to respond to personal invita-
tions from design teams to discuss their ideas after 
Stage 2. Select research advisors made presenta-
tions during the Stage 2 kickoff, and many attended 
the regional workshops and most RBD meetings. 
Many advisors felt they had a responsibility to ensure 
that design teams relied on evidence and that the 
high-level design interventions focused on vulner-
able populations. Depending on their schedules, 
some research advisors participated in the October 
jury review of design opportunities.   
Reflecting the synchronicity of their research 
interests and RBD, a few research advisors first par-
ticipated in RBD as members of design teams that did 
not advance to Stage 2. Their involvement reflected 
a deeper interest in fields relating to climate change 
and design interventions. Other research advisors 
were affiliated with research centers focusing on 
issues relating to RBD and felt that not being involved 
would be a missed opportunity. For example, one 
advisor saw the potential for RBD to contribute to his 
own work on climate change. 
Many advisors already were doing work related to 
Sandy and disaster recovery, so RBD aligned nicely 
with their interests. For example, one advisor had been 
researching Sandy’s impact on housing stock. Several 
advisors participated because they had been asked 
by IPK’s Eric Klinenberg, whose work on post-disas-
ter scenarios they respected. Many advisors cited a 
general dissatisfaction with the status quo of disaster 
relief and rebuilding efforts, and viewed RBD as a 
proof-of-concept for a new method of resilience work. 
Advisors also were motivated because of dedication to 
their respective fields and their hope that things they 
viewed as important – such as housing, scientific rigor 
and community input – would play a role in RBD. 
Jurors
Jurors, similarly, were motivated based on personal 
invitations to participate as much as their interest 
in RBD’s contribution to their individual areas of 
expertise. Jurors’ commitments were primarily for the 
conclusions of Stages 2 and 3, and they had little inter-
action with design teams or RBD staff otherwise. The 
jury members were appointed by the HUD Secretary 
and were required to show there was no conflict of 
interest (HUD, 2013b). The RBD jury was chaired by 
Secretary Donovan and co-chaired by Ovink. 
Other sites, such as Hoboken, Bridgeport, 
Ocean County and Nassau County, used 
RBD as part of internal efforts to develop 
special plans around resilience and now 
plan to use RBD ideas in their future 
resilience plans regardless of whether 
or not they are awarded CDBG-DR funds 
through RBD.
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The role of RBD jurors was advisory. They gave 
feedback at two key transition points – the ends of 
Stages 2 and 3 – only to inform the final decisions 
which were to be made by HUD. Jurors were not 
involved in the Stage 1 selection of design teams. 
Members of the jury were given schedules and asked 
to appear at certain events to evaluate the quality 
of design opportunities, basing their evaluations on 
their professional experience and knowledge. 
Several jurors noted that they had limited interac-
tions with design teams (though one exception may 
have been Eric Klinenberg). Jurors also mentioned 
that familiarity with the general work of the design 
teams and with the architectural design world were 
motivating factors for their involvement in RBD. 
Many jurors had previously participated in competi-
tions, and while they initially agreed to participate, 
they found that RBD was different: they would not 
make final decisions, and the process extended over 
a long timeframe. 
State and local governments 
Elected officials from many of the state and local 
public jurisdictions interacted with design teams 
and provided them with letters of support, demon-
strating to HUD and RBD leadership that their mu-
nicipalities or states were willing to serve as grantees 
for awarded CDBG-DR funding. They participated 
in site visits and worked with teams to respond to 
questions, highlight important issues, represent 
their jurisdiction’s point of view, and compare RBD 
projects to existing plans (such as current master 
plans, redevelopment plans, and/or special post-
Sandy recovery or resilience plans). State govern-
ments and New York City had already established 
early plans for their first two obligations of CDBG-DR 
funds, including home rebuilding programs and, in 
New York State’s case, a grassroots planning effort 
in the form of the New York Rising Community Re-
construction Program (New York Rising, 2014).
Further, some cities already had plans, such as New 
York City’s PlaNYC and its Special Initiative for Re-
building and Resiliency (SIRR), and simply compared 
them to proposed projects or used them as a way to 
provide feedback to design teams. Other sites, such 
as Hoboken, Bridgeport, Ocean County and Nassau 
County, used RBD as part of internal efforts to develop 
special plans around resilience and now plan to use 
RBD ideas in their future resilience plans regard-
less of whether or not they are awarded CDBG-DR 
funds through RBD. Some cities have been actively 
involved in building community support for projects, 
recognizing that community input will strengthen 
the quality of products.  
Many elected officials mentioned fiscal realities as 
a major motivation for participating in RBD: juris-
dictions with funded projects will receive significant 
CDBG-DR funds that will augment existing or desired 
resilience efforts. Because their municipalities are in 
Sandy-affected regions, many of these officials also 
supported RBD because they want to strengthen 
their communities prior to the next storm. Many 
view RBD as a foundation for future urban resilience 
efforts. 
Some elected officials viewed RBD as a mechanism 
for strengthening pre-existing relationships with 
key agencies and for catalyzing interest in resilience 
from other agencies. For example, one city leveraged 
RBD to coordinate resilience plans with adjacent 
cities, overcoming what had been significant political 
and fiscal boundaries. Similar to motivations cited by 
research advisors and other content experts, elected 
officials viewed RBD as an opportunity to overcome 
the status quo disaster-recovery response and to 
develop better funding models. One city official cited 
the lack of a prototype for an urban resilience model 
as a motivation for participating in RBD, speculating 
that RBD could produce urban resilience models for 
the rest of the country. 
Community-based organizations and  
citizen groups
The community organizations purposely involved in 
RBD were diverse and represented different geo-
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graphic areas, segments of the community and 
advocacy angles. They assisted the design teams 
in three main ways. First, community organizations 
provided background information on their com-
munities, sharing knowledge of their communi-
ties’ needs, the physical and political landscapes 
of the region, and content knowledge in specific 
issue areas. In the initial stages of the process, 
they shared knowledge through presentations of 
their work to the design teams and then offered 
advice to the design teams as they formed their 
ideas. Second, community organizations used 
their networks and infrastructure to help design 
teams further engage the community by directing 
them to other important organizations and leaders 
with whom they could consult. Third, they helped 
organize and publicize community engagement 
events through, e.g. hosting events, facilitating 
discussions, knocking on doors and, in some cases, 
attending the RBD jury presentations.
RBD teams identified the community organizations 
through various avenues. Some organizations were 
referred to the design teams by other community 
organizations or working groups, e.g. a community 
organization would host the initial meeting between 
a design team and another community organiza-
tion. Other times, one community organization 
would provide another organization’s contact in-
formation to the design teams. Some organizations 
made connections with design teams when the 
teams presented at the meetings of working groups 
they were a part of or when organizations attended 
RBD-specific events. In one instance, a design team 
attended a workshop hosted by a community or-
ganization and reached out to that organization 
afterward. Of those that received grants from other 
RBD funders concerned with comprehensive en-
gagement, most noted that the funds were helpful 
but not particularly a motivating factor since their 
costs exceeded grant values.
The community organizations that were involved 
in RBD chose to be involved for similar reasons. 
Generally, they felt that RBD could provide benefits 
to their communities and that the initiative was 
in line with their missions, such as promoting 
economic development or protecting homes from 
severe weather. One organization described the 
alignment between RBD’s mission and its own: “We 
jumped in because this was something that was 
already part of my organization’s DNA.” Another 
organization thought RBD was “a really good op-
portunity for us to share [our] work” and “amplify 
our message.” 
Obviously, the community organizations supported 
RBD’s emphasis on community engagement. They 
wanted to ensure that the design teams were truly 
listening to community voices since the teams came 
from outside the community. A few community orga-
nizations that worked with low-income communities 
and/or communities of color emphasized this point. 
One organization said, “We wanted to make sure our 
most vulnerable communities had a voice.” For one 
organization, the RBD team’s commitment to incor-
porating community feedback made the organization 
think it was worth its time to assist the team.
The community organizations that were not involved 
in RBD (and responded to the evaluation team) 
chose not to be involved for a variety of reasons. One 
group disagreed with the mission of RBD because it 
supported long-term projects as opposed to short-
term relief. One organization was skeptical of the 
benefits of RBD after witnessing numerous stalled 
post-Sandy relief efforts. That organization and 
two other organizations that participated in RBD 
perceived a sense of “Sandy fatigue” or “Sandy 
overload” in the community because of the sheer 
volume of Sandy-related projects. Other organiza-
tions supported RBD, but simply could not devote 
time to it.
“We wanted to make sure our most 
vulnerable communities had a voice.” 
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Design teams
All of the lead organizations in the design teams that 
were motivated to participate in RBD had already 
worked in and/or wanted to expand their portfolios 
in projects pertaining to climate change issues and 
resilience. In addition to the business opportunity 
of expanding the firm’s proposals, many key infor-
mants expressed personal interest in climate change 
issues and resilience. Key informants also expressed 
a desire to work on a project associated with experts 
and leaders, including those in federal, state and 
local governments. 
Per Secretary Donovan’s and Ovink’s original 
intent, the design teams were able to represent 
different perspectives on water management. 
In fact, many of the teams from outside of the 
northeast region of the US were eager to share 
their local/regional knowledge about water issues 
and flood management in the Sandy-affected 
areas, e.g. the Bjarke Ingels Group (BIG) and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
teams were co-led by European architects. Both 
these teams expressed a desire to share their 
“European sensibilities” because they felt the US 
“has a tendency to be really atomized”, and they 
found Sandy-related projects to be an opportune 
start to discuss regional strategies. 
Most of the lead teams also had offices in the New 
York region, although several had offices outside of 
the region, including Boston (Sasaki), New Orleans 
(Waggonner and Ball/unabridged), the Netherlands 
(MIT Center for Advanced Urbanism (CAU) + ZUS + 
Urbanisten), and Philadelphia (PennDesign/Olin). 
Naturally, lead organizations assembled teams based 
on past work experiences and anticipated work plans 
and designs. As design interventions, issues and RBD 
deliverables such as cost benefit analysis became 
clearer, collaborators were sometimes added to the 
team. A number of teams included Dutch collabora-
tors who lent expertise in engineering and architec-
ture (e.g. OMA and MIT). 
The design teams can be organized into four catego-
ries based on each team’s lead organization: univer-
sities (MIT, PennDesign/Olin); large firms (Sasaki, 
OMA, BIG, Waggoner and Ball/unabridged); small 
firms (SCAPE, Interboro, WXY); and one professional 
real estate advisory firm (HR&A). Larger firms such 
as Sasaki, OMA, and Waggonner and Ball tended 
to have fewer organizations represented on their 
design teams, mainly because the large firms have 
large staff capacity, including architecture, urban 
planning and community development/outreach, 
and research and analysis. The selection of team 
members involved in different events and public 
meetings and presentations varied per team, often 
with partners or junior staff attending more opera-
tional or less public opportunities.
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3
Competition activities and outputs
Competition, the second of the four critical domains 
of interest in this evaluation, refers to the individual 
and collective activities of the stakeholders as well 
as some of the key outputs of the RBD model.6 Since 
its inception, RBD has blurred the lines between 
process and product innovation and the realities 
of traditional design competitions and infrastruc-
ture development. This ambiguity has been inten-
tional and tense. In Stages 1 (team selection) and 2 
(research), RBD harnessed the lack of parameters to 
generate open-ended questions and foster radical 
thinking about the real environmental, social and 
economic challenges faced by Sandy-affected com-
munities. While the final verdict on the projects’ in-
novativeness – as well as the evaluation of whether 
the final state of the projects yield significant and 
positive impacts compared to other resilience strat-
egies – is yet to be delivered, the products of Stage 2 
have generated excitement.
3.1. Findings
Key positive findings regarding the competition 
aspects of RBD include the following.
6 Note: This chapter does not discuss the two key activity areas of 
“participation” (engagement of local community groups and citizens), 
and “implementation” (solicitation of support from state and local 
policymakers).  Rather, these two subjects are fully analyzed in Chap-
ters 4 and 5, respectively.
Finding 8:  RBD demonstrates many of the best 
aspects of a design competition even though several 
stakeholders described it as not representative of 
design competitions.  RBD produced a tremendous 
volume of juried design analysis and plans whose 
value far exceeds the resources that were made 
available. RBD also improved upon traditional design 
competition by introducing research, public engage-
ment and practical implementation stages often in 
collaboration across the teams – three key oppor-
tunities and one framework that are uncommon in 
traditional competitions. 
Finding 9:  RBD demonstrated innovative de-
partures from traditional federal practice in the 
execution of the competition through its unique 
public-philanthropic partnership. In this partner-
ship, foundations contributed resources for the 
competition’s management and team prizes, and 
federal resources provided implementation awards 
to recipient communities. 
Finding 10:  RBD staff produced an   organizational 
structure that managed the detailed tasks with no 
preexisting blueprint. RBD’s unique management 
structure existed parallel to, but separate from, 
the traditional federal grant solicitation and award 
processes that are typically burdensome, highly 
regulated and lengthy
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The evaluation also noted the following key challeng-
es that constrained the execution of the competition.
Finding 11:  Lack of precedent and preexisting plans 
for RBD led to changing and growing require-
ments for deliverables, participation in activities, 
and, in some cases, reconfigured teams. While RBD 
responded to this by providing multiple channels 
for design teams to access information, there 
were increased opportunities for communications 
slippages and varying interpretations of deliverables 
and of the post-jury award criteria.  
Finding 12: The intensity of the compressed 
timeframe was taxing, as noted by all stakeholder 
groups. In ten months, RBD activities were under-
taken across competition, research, design devel-
opment, jurisdictional negotiations, media outreach 
and community engagement – a process that 
typically would take a minimum of two years. 
Finding 13:  The design teams’ resource limitations 
exacerbated RBD’s intensity. The individual teams 
spent well more than the allotted funds, typically at a 
magnitude of three to six times over. 
  
Analysis of the activities and challenges associated 
with the competition resulted in two overarching 
recommendations regarding Phase I’s competi-
tion processes and their execution, should they be 
employed in an entirely new competition. As with all 
innovations and pilot efforts, adjustments in plans 
and activities are possible. These range from stag-
gering the stages to allow for longer design devel-
opment and research to having management staff, 
plans and clear parameters early – an adjustment 
that will be necessary especially for Phase II. 
Replication of the RBD Phase I competition is possible 
but will depend on specific activities. Some RBD ac-
tivities can become ongoing, fundamental (such as a 
research advisory group and other networks), while 
others can be replicated with some of the manage-
ment adjustments described here. Still others, such 
as leadership, sustained vision and funding partners, 
are specific to this post-Sandy context and could 
prove beyond the reach of other cases in which repli-
cation is envisioned.  
3.2. Competition activities 
Numerous activities transpired across the formal 
stages of the RBD competition’s history, from Stage 
1 through Stage 3. A visual timeline is provided in 
Figure 3 of both RBD and contextual events. The 
management plans also evolved from conceptual 
stages with milestones early on. Henk Ovink was the 
primary thought leader behind RBD after joining the 
Task Force in March 2013 (officially on April 1, 2013). 
During Stage 1, Ovink and Kevin Bush of HUD were 
the primary organizers and advocates for RBD, with 
assistance from Task Force staff Marion McFadden 
and Laurel Blatchford. RBD staff had the massive 
logistical assignment of managing multiple support 
and funding stakeholders, assisting design teams 
and reaching out to community and political stake-
holders. As such, Ovink proposed hiring a full time 
RBD project manager before the RFQ and, ultimate-
ly, Amy Chester was hired at the start of Stage 2. 
Since she did not begin officially until a week after 
the ten design teams were announced in August, 
full management plans, including communication 
protocols and coordination, were not inscribed early 
on. RBD’s rapid pace necessitated an evolving man-
agement structure but could have benefited from 
more robust logistical paths, schedules and prepa-
rations earlier. In part due to the innovative nature 
of the RBD vision in general as well as the nature 
of those early plans, Chester was constricted in her 
ability to forge a comprehensive plan. 
However, upon arrival, she developed a regular com-
munications schedule with RBD administrative staff 
and design teams, instated regular correspondence 
with liaisons from each of the RBD administra-
tive teams, created channels for feedback between 
Ovink and the design teams, and created a mediation 
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FIGURE 3. Post-Sandy and RBD timeline
Phase I
Phase II
RBD launched/RFQ issued
RBD rst jury 
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
4
3
6
4
2013
2014
2012
IPK, MAS/VAI/RPA Grants nalized
RFQ submissions review began
Federal Register Notice of RBD published
HUD selects 10 design teams 
RBD Gulf Coast site visit
RBD Team-specic  community workshops
First RBD Scale It Up event
RBD nal jury 
HUD announces 6 RBD winners
Hurricane Sandy hit NY-NJ
Sandy Task Force created
NYC launched SIRR
Army Corps comprehensive study began
Sandy Supplemental Appropriation Bill signed
First HUD CDBG-DR funds allocation
Army Corps First Interim Report released
Sandy Task Force Flood Risk Reduction 
Standard released
NY State Rising Program launched
NJ State Post-Sandy Grant Program launched
NYC issued SIRR Final Report
Second HUD CDBG-DR funds allocation
Third HUD CDBG- DR funds allocation
Sandy Task Force Report released
Ovink joined Sandy Task Force & HUD
Rockefeller Foundation committed 
Resiliency Incentive Prize Workshop held
HUD & NEA plan RFQ and selection process
RBD held discussions with IPK, MAS, VAI, RPA
US-Dutch MOU signed
RBD rst research site tour
Amy Chester hired as RBD Project Manager
RBD regional tours and public events
Contextual event
RBD event
Formal milestone
Operational event 
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Jan
Apr
Jun
Nov
Dec
Jan
Design opportunities selected
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platform with community organizations and local 
policymakers. The development of the team liaisons 
proposed by the MAS project leads, Alexis Taylor 
and Courtney Smith, with input from Chester and 
Ovink, was also instituted to ensure that shared roles 
among the support partners (IPK, MAS, VAI, and 
RPA) would be executed efficiently, would apply the 
individual liaison skills and interests appropriately, 
and would benefit from the collective knowledge of 
all four organizations. 
Staff from all four support partners also served as 
site liaisons for each of the RBD sites. Each site had 
two liaisons (one senior and one junior, from different 
organizations) along with additional participation by 
the VAI staff for Scale It Up activities. The roles of the 
liaisons were multifold and ranged from coordinating 
logistics of public meetings and planning events to 
assisting the design teams with introductions to local 
policymakers and community groups.  
There were many informal opportunities for liaisons 
to correspond with one another and for design 
teams to meet at events and meetings, as well as 
the potential to formally share best practices during 
weekly calls. However, there was no excess capacity 
or time to execute best practices across the sites, 
and there was little documentation of these. As 
events and deliverables piled on, reality set in. There 
was very little time for rumination and adaptation of 
even the best practices that were shared orally, par-
ticularly among design teams that were balancing 
design development with community participation 
efforts.  
Constrained by requests from funders and restric-
tions from HUD, support partners as well as the 
design teams had to deliver logistically, helping 
plan events, set up meetings and provide crucial 
resources to design teams with the same short 
notice that the design teams experienced. All stake-
holders noted this as an unenviable management as-
signment. During the research phase, RBD and IPK 
staff had to make quick decisions about speakers, 
issues to highlight and workshops to host. The 
frequency of the requirements in Stage 2 also meant 
that the RBD administrative team had to be respon-
sive to the demands of the RBD design teams. RBD 
management staff had to be malleable and respon-
sive to HUD’s regulatory restrictions, and this had 
to be translated to the RBD administrative team. 
One stakeholder noted that “the collaboration [of 
the RBD administrative staff] had to overcome the 
chaos” of the RBD process. 
Even though many of the regional meetings and site 
visits were organized in haste, they appeared to be 
executed clearly and seamlessly with only a few ex-
ceptions. For example, a performance survey by IPK 
suggested that many of the key activities held early 
on were helpful to the teams. The RBD administra-
tive team was also able to fulfill many of the main 
goals in the final work plan proposed in the support 
partners’ plan. While RBD administrative staff had 
drawn up a work plan delineating duties, the massive 
logistical operation with a myriad of details required 
every organization, at every level, to contribute 
whenever possible. Remarkably, the design teams 
and RBD staff and administrative team met all the 
procedural deadlines and milestones.
The size of the RBD team, which was composed of 
the main staff and the administrative team, was 
also sometimes distracting. As one stakeholder at 
a community group declared, “There were so many 
of them.” The eventual increased communication 
As events and deliverables piled on, 
reality set in. There was very little time 
for rumination and adaptation of even the 
best practices that were shared orally, 
particularly among design teams that 
were balancing design development with 
community participation efforts.
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among the RBD administrative team members, 
design teams and RBD staff did not account for 
parallel conversations taking place among the many 
players involved, including HUD. Some RBD admin-
istrative staff reported learning of RBD decisions or 
requests from design teams, after the design team 
members heard from RBD staff. 
Furthermore, interviews suggested that there was 
inconsistency in the involvement across design 
teams with their liaisons in the RBD administrative 
teams, as well as between the design teams and 
research advisory group, RBD staff or HUD. The re-
lationships among, and personalities of, the design 
teams and the liaisons from VAI, MAS and RPA 
varied and affected the amount of guidance and help 
the design teams requested or received. One stake-
holder referred to the liaison position as a “glorified 
errand boy,” though most viewed logistical manage-
ment as a godsend.
Funders were not necessarily kept updated of the 
everyday happenings of RBD, nor did they request 
to be. However, some funders relied on intelli-
gence from community groups, which presented 
the potential for inconsistent or inaccurate reports. 
Funders did impose extra management requirements 
by requesting that community groups be funded to 
increase public participation. The management and 
need for approval of microgrants became a logistical 
nightmare that could have been done in many other 
ways – with a more formal selection and funds distri-
bution process – had the funders’ expectations been 
identified earlier and community engagement plans 
described sufficiently to meet their concerns.
However, the main overall comments from inter-
viewees concerned the frenetic pace of the RBD 
stages and their consequent expectations. The 
pace of the RBD process required making hard and 
fast decisions, which unsurprisingly meant that 
the process and management was determined by 
dictum and crisis. In order for all the many pieces to 
fit together, RBD had to be micro-managed, with 
oversight ranging from RBD website development to 
changes in event schedules – a level of management 
that was not something many of RBD administrative 
and design team members were used to.  
The lack of a clear work plan from the beginning and 
the quick pace of the RBD process affected what the 
RBD administrative team was able to accomplish 
and when. While IPK began work during Stage 1, it 
had to galvanize its community of experts and begin 
preparing for Stage 2 even before its final grant 
agreement with the Rockefeller Foundation was for-
malized. In fact, RBD’s administrative team did not 
finalize and fully execute grant agreements with the 
Rockefeller Foundation until mid-August, after work 
had begun. As with the design teams, the RBD ad-
ministrative staff had to incur costs before payment. 
Many key informants felt that MAS, VAI and RPA 
served more as logistical coordinators for the 
community events instead of having more substan-
tive, content-related technical assistance roles in fa-
cilitating the development of the designs. Potentially 
because of time constraints, motivation or lack of 
prioritization, the RBD administrative team altered 
many expected deliverables. As it was, though, 
RBD involved a massive logistical undertaking with 
myriad details that needed staffing and short-term 
coordination. By the time of the final jury, ultimately, 
this coordination successfully met the planned and 
emerging demands.
The main overall comments from 
interviewees concerned the frenetic pace 
of the RBD stages and their consequent 
expectations. The pace of the RBD process 
required making hard and fast decisions, 
which unsurprisingly meant that the 
process and management was determined 
by dictum and crisis.
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One noteworthy contributor to the management 
execution of RBD was the fortuitous good personal 
working relationship between the visionary (Ovink) 
and the implementers, including Chester and Davis. 
On the whole, a similar camaraderie was established 
between Chester and the support partner staff. 
Without these working relationships, RBD would not 
have been able to accomplish all of its goals in the 
short time available. Furthermore, the management 
execution suggests that replication of RBD Phase I is 
feasible.
3.3. Outputs
Though the volume of activities produced a tre-
mendous number of outputs, four key categories 
of outputs are noted because of their bearing on 
the design teams’ ultimate products, and because 
they proved to be innovative supports as well as 
challenges. The outputs – selection, jury and award 
benchmarks, design team resources and deliver-
ables, design development, spillover activities – are 
discussed below. 
Selection, jury and award benchmarks
The gateway events at the end of each Phase I 
stage that determined the content and activities 
of the following stage were important components 
of the RBD activities. The original RFQ, the design 
team selections of August 2013, the design op-
portunity jury of October 2013, and the final jury in 
April 2014 were all critical determinants of the final 
designs.  A less obvious aspect of these events 
was how they shaped the RBD design teams and 
processes. 
Eligibility. The first example of this output was the 
effect on the compositions of design teams with 
regard to legal entity eligibility, conflicts of interest 
and the range of professional needs within the 
teams. Though very specific with regard to pro-
fessional expertise and disciplinary background in 
design, the RFQ was relatively neutral with regard to 
the legal characterization of the entities. Non-profit 
design and community development entities also 
applied. 
As a consequence, the selected teams’ leads were 
from university-based research centers or tradi-
tional for-profit architectural firms. The principals in 
architectural firms commonly serve as architectural 
faculty, including many of the selected design teams 
that were not officially based in a university setting. 
Those teams that specified their university affilia-
tion were able to enlist other resources from their 
academic colleagues, including students. This lack of 
clarity put them at an advantage. 
Multiple entries. A related eligibility issue was the 
description of requirements regarding submissions 
across multiple teams of a single entity. In the event 
of such a scenario, the organizations in question 
would have to recuse themselves from all but one 
team. These terms, however, were flexibly applied 
after selection. Regardless of intent, the lack of spec-
ificity allowed for certain competitive advantages 
that could be perceived as unfair.
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Professional qualifications. A final concern noted 
by design stakeholders was the lack of specificity 
regarding the professional qualifications that would 
ultimately be required during the competition. 
This was particularly true of cost estimating skills, 
certain community engagement specializations, and 
knowledge of political negotiations and CDBG regu-
lations. Many of these general areas of work were 
defined in the RFQ (except cost estimating), though 
the degree to which they would be needed for com-
pletion of the requirements for these areas was not.
RBD also established the federal team selection 
panel and jury members. The diverse expertise 
among both groups was noted positively by all 
stakeholders. Having federal employees serve on 
the selection committee allowed RBD to avoid 
conflict of interest requirements, and final selec-
tions generally matched the panel’s recommenda-
tions. Other factors that were not clearly identified 
in the RFQ may have played a role in selection such 
as adequate representation from regional firms or 
international composition. Similar comments were 
made for the jury deliberations regarding design op-
portunity selections, with several jurors and design 
teams opining that factors such as geographic 
diversity or pre-existing commitments from cities 
played a role in the choices. Ultimately, the RFQ was 
very broad and purposely open-ended though some 
minor specification of eligibility and requirements of 
submissions and selection criteria may have clarified 
perceptions of preferences or conflicts. Such clarity 
is typical and, for many reasons, necessary in formal 
public solicitations.
Panels and juries. Several comments regarded the 
logistics and execution of the selection panels and 
juries. Representatives from other federal agencies, 
who were surprised by the speed with which the so-
licitation, response and review processes were held, 
casually noted that they wished their traditional so-
licitations could be equally speedy. Those involved 
with both processes commented on the clarity of 
instructions and procedures for the selection panel, 
but expressed some concern regarding the lack 
of prepared materials and sufficient advance time 
for review in the juries. Jury members were also 
concerned about the lack of clarity regarding their 
roles vis-à-vis final award, and recommend a confer-
ence call or other discussion prior to jury presenta-
tions and deliberations.
For the teams, the first jury was particularly positive 
because of the amount of interaction both with jury 
members and other teams. Ultimately, though, there 
was limited feedback from the panels and juries: i) 
to the design teams, which they felt would have 
been helpful for improving their designs, and ii) to 
the declined teams who received no final scores or 
comments that are typical of federal competitive 
grants. Teams relied on informal discussions held 
with RBD after the selection.
Design team resources and deliverables
Not surprisingly, the most common comment 
among the design teams had to do with the amount 
of work involved in the short time frame, particu-
larly with regard to the award grants that were 
provided. Competitors rarely profit from design 
competitions, but in this case, the teams had costs 
that reached three to four times the award value, 
not accounting for their team partners’ expenses. 
Several teams estimated their cost burden at up to 
six times the award value – a rate that many stake-
holders referred to as “exploitative.” For example, 
travel expenses increased significantly because 
of constant changes in travel schedules, a burden 
especially noted by design teams whose primary 
offices were not located near their selected sites 
(including Dutch firms) and by the smaller design 
firms that lacked other resources. 
Deliverables. The primary contributor to the 
perceived burden, beyond time constraints, was the 
fundamental volume of, and changes in, requested 
deliverables. Even with the information provided in 
the RFQ, not one of the interviewees anticipated 
the extent of the workload, including deliverables, 
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engagement with the community or CDBG-DR 
grantees, or the pace of the RBD process. 
The final design team grant award agreements 
called for deliverables and participation in many ac-
tivities that were not necessarily anticipated early 
on, and not explicitly described in the original RFQ 
and Federal Register notice. Common responses to 
the discrepancy between resources and scope were: 
“insane amount of engagement,” “never-ending” 
and “ever-changing” requests, and “scope creep.” 
Design teams and their expert partners were also 
concerned that the description and specification 
of deliverables did not use professionally accurate 
descriptions of design documents or cost-benefit 
analyses. Described by one team member as “detail 
misalignment,” most teams suggested some of the 
angst regarding increasing requests could have been 
mitigated if they had had better description of de-
liverables to match professional practice regarding 
level of detail, professional terms of art, and technical 
assumptions.
Scope of projects. Due to the informality of many 
discussions, there was confusion as to the scope of 
projects or likely CDBG-DR award outlays. Design 
teams’ understanding of the available funds for project 
awards ranged from $1 billion to $15 billion, even in the 
final weeks of Stage 3, while the more likely estimate 
was in the $2 to $3 billion range. Even though it was 
possibly due to their own misinterpretation, design 
teams’ confusion could have been reduced with 
explicit documents as they entered Stage 3.
Management planning. Design teams and their 
expert partners were also concerned about the de-
scription and specification of deliverables, such as not 
using professionally accurate descriptions of design 
documents or cost-benefit analyses. Described 
by one team member as “detail misalignment,” 
most teams suggested that using better descrip-
tions of deliverables to match professional practice 
regarding level of detail,  professional terms of art, 
and technical assumptions may have mitigated some 
of the angst regarding increasing requests.
Ultimately, these expectations and increasingly 
limited resources and time to address them had an 
effect on the management planning for individual 
design teams as well as expectations of CDBG-DR 
recipients. Even with a summary of some of the de-
liverables in the RFQ, such as the regional meetings 
and site visits, the actual day-to-day requirements 
and the rapid announcements of when the deliver-
ables would occur proved challenging. Some teams 
noted they had curtailed some design activities and 
innovative community engagement strategies out 
of a fear of requests for new deliverables that could 
limit the resources for those activities.
Award uncertainty. The fact that CDBG-DR funding 
had never been used in this way before caused 
confusion for a variety of stakeholders. State, local 
and federal officials were uncertain of the exact 
process by which CDBG-DR funds could be appropri-
ated to winning RBD designs or even the amount of 
funding available for these designs. The RBD team 
was unable to provide a definitive value to the final 
awards, though a general cap of $200 million was 
suggested by HUD. This ambiguity was also partially 
intentional, since RBD did not want to limit innova-
tive design concepts at this stage. Consequently, 
the design teams had to develop designs and cost-
benefit analyses without clear financial parameters 
and pitch their ideas to community and government 
stakeholders when a great deal of information was 
missing. 
Design teams and their expert partners 
were also concerned that the description 
and specification of deliverables did not 
use professionally accurate descriptions of 
design documents or cost-benefit analyses.
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The argument was that innovation should not be con-
stricted by costs too early. Surprisingly, this sentiment 
was shared across the design teams, including those 
that were most vociferous about their resource 
burdens. Not one design team acknowledged that it 
had ever considered curtailing its design development 
or not meeting its main deliverables. 
Many firms noted that the intensity helped spur inno-
vative thinking about their designs, and also may have 
had the added benefit of pushing community groups 
and officials to sign on more quickly. One team leader 
described her team’s management of expectations as 
“exciting and frustrating at the same time.” Despite 
trepidations about resources and expectations, the 
teams became, in the words of more than one design 
team, RBD’s greatest “cheerleaders.”
Design development
Time persisted as the greatest pressure for almost 
all stakeholders. This concern took two forms: the 
limited overall time available in Stages 2 and 3, and 
the sequencing of the stages. 
Insufficient time. While the design teams and 
research advisors found the events and information 
of Stage 2 helpful, they also noted that time con-
straints limited their ability to further engage the 
research or the advisors for their specific projects. 
This was exacerbated by the fact that requested 
federal data was never delivered, and the IPK digital 
research report materials posted in January were 
of a more general nature (Rockefeller Foundation, 
2013b).7 
The solicited research papers covered a range of 
relevant topics from coastal risks, regional ecology 
7 Other federal documents, including the first two CDBG-DR notices of 
funding availability and the DOT Sandy competitive grants referred to 
“RBD collaborative risk analysis,” as well, though representatives from 
both agencies noted that they never received any documentation 
or products of this work. (HUD, 2013e; FTA, 2013). The teams’ own 
research reports are expected to be released in June 2014.
and social vulnerabilities – focusing on the post-
Sandy context of the metropolitan region but also 
on scholarship based in other scenarios (Been and 
Ellen, 2013; Jacob, 2013; Waldman and Solecki, 
2013). Combined with the waning “working groups” 
that were unsuccessfully fostered in Stage 2, these 
materials were insufficient for the teams to engage 
in to finalize the research for their planned sites. This 
meant teams were obliged to conduct additional 
research – an intentional strategy of RBD but one 
that challenged most design teams.
Ongoing research advice. Virtually all of the design 
teams noted that an additional limited amount of 
time to continue Stage 2 would have been invalu-
able. Several research advisors may have wanted to 
engage longer to provide guidance, and the process 
may have been assisted by involving research 
advisors for the long-term such as more traditional 
research panels or advisory groups to “better carry 
over” the research discussions. Advisors, some 
community groups and other resilience experts felt 
that certain resilience strategies, such as focusing on 
housing resilience opportunities or relocation, were 
not fully considered because of that rapid transition.
Overload. With the turn to Stage 3, the teams 
attempted to continue their own research efforts, 
but were simultaneously addressing their new en-
gagement and policymaker outreach mandates 
while developing their designs. The parameters as-
sociated with RBD’s specific funding (namely, HUD’s 
CDBG-DR outlays) and political considerations 
(CDBG-DR eligible grantees’ desires) became more 
apparent to design teams in Stage 3, and effectively 
prohibited certain innovations from moving forward 
at worst or tweaked other innovations at best. There 
is no evidence that Stage 3 reduced or diminished 
any of Stage 2’s innovative concepts according to 
the design teams or jury members. One design team, 
though, speculated that it only devoted 20 percent 
of its time to design innovation in Stage 3.
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Regional vs site specificity. Stage 3’s project imple-
mentation focus had an effect on the teams with 
regional geographic scopes – that is, design oppor-
tunities for the entire, literal Sandy-affected region 
– as opposed to site-specific projects that could be 
replicated throughout the region. Early on, design 
teams were exposed to research resources that shed 
light on regional challenges, and met representa-
tives from communities and governments across the 
Sandy-affected region. However, the transition to 
project-focused opportunities generally resulted in 
site-specific (or single-jurisdiction) design opportu-
nities. 
This was particularly true given the unique nature 
of CDBG funding’s grantee eligibility and dispersal 
requirements. Federal funding sources that can be 
more readily employed on the regional scale have 
been less forthcoming, such as those from ACE and 
the DOT. This limitation provoked one stakeholder to 
note that RBD should have “RDBG” funding – that is 
“Regional Development Block Grants.” Yet, designs 
with larger, regional geographic scopes have effec-
tively been discouraged.   
Scaling down. Various interpretations of this pivot 
in attention were expressed, from noting that some 
things “got lost in the translation” from strategy to 
sites to questioning why the RBD model wanted to 
start “silo-ing what they didn’t want to silo before.” 
One support partner, referencing the Scale It Up 
community engagement strategy, referred to the 
transition to Stage 3 as the process of “scale[ing] it 
down” for design development. A research advisor 
who continued involvement after Stage 2 noted 
the risk of losing the “visionary and transformative 
aspects” identified in Stage 2. In sum, the transition 
to Stage 3 did not “result in less innovation, just not 
more” of it.
Spillover activities and outputs
Several spillover products of the RBD Phase I activi-
ties were noted repeatedly by many stakeholders. 
Though not necessarily intended, these outputs ulti-
mately served many other purposes, such as keeping 
design teams engaged. In particular, the networks 
and goodwill established among the design teams 
in Stage 2 secured their ongoing commitment to the 
RBD vision. This often translated into personal com-
mitments to the communities in which the teams 
worked. Starting in Stage 2’s regional tours, the 
sense of common purpose generated by shared dis-
cussion and inquiry was described by one observer 
as a “brilliant” strategic move on the part of the RBD 
team. All teams said that the preview of sites on 
the tours prejudiced their selection of project sites, 
because they understood where politically open 
locations were but also because they became profes-
sionally interested in what they were seeing.
This intellectual curiosity and professional commit-
ment was also noted in the many university-based 
design studios and lectures that blossomed around 
RBD. These activities – which contrasted sharply with 
most other design competitions in which competing 
teams are purposely guarded – promise longer-term 
significance, especially the creation of complemen-
tary design discussions, public forums and architec-
tural pedagogical studios. 
One outcome of this goodwill is ongoing interest in 
resilience among these designers and the design 
community in general – a similar outcome to the 
ongoing interest in affordable housing that occurred 
after the New York New Housing design competition. 
As one stakeholder noted, “it’s easy to get caught up 
in logistics and funding, but the network will be an 
important legacy.”
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4
Participation activities  
and outputs
The requirement for engagement with local citizens 
and community groups in the areas devastated by 
Sandy has proven a key innovation of RBD. According 
to the literature, this practice had not only been tra-
ditionally omitted, it had resulted in less-than-ap-
propriate design products. In non-competed design 
efforts – for example, on an actual public facility or 
large-scale development – community engagement 
is a prerequisite to decision-making. To that end, 
typologies of engagement have been developed 
in the literature and professional practices have 
been developed by conscientious designers and 
community planners.
As with actual development efforts, RBD projects do 
not exist in a vacuum. Community groups – most of 
which have organized around post-Sandy efforts but 
also longer term master planning and development 
projects and economic challenges in their communi-
ties – were consulted despite the significant potential 
that the projects would not be implemented. As 
noted early in the RBD planning process: “without 
dedicated resources to support community engage-
ment, the RBD process runs the risk of becoming an 
abstract, impractical process, detached from the real 
concerns of local people and deprived of the benefits 
that diverse participants provide to create effective, 
implementable solutions” (MAS, 2013). 
However, this noteworthy attempt to integrate 
community voices opened the opportunity for 
criticism that the engagement would be partial. In 
all cases, the attempt to include community par-
ticipation in the specific communities in question as 
well as generate awareness of resilience challenges 
in the broader American populace involved many 
activities and resulted in numerous outputs, not the 
least of which were explicit statements of support by 
local organizations. 
Community groups – most of which have 
organized around post-Sandy efforts 
but also longer term master planning 
and development projects and economic 
challenges in their communities – 
were consulted despite the significant 
potential that the projects would not be 
implemented.
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4.1. Findings
The key community participation findings reinforce 
previous findings that were made. 
Finding 14:  The inclusion of community engage-
ment and outreach in a design competition with its 
typical constraints was innovative and ambitious. 
As noted in the literature regarding design competi-
tions, this activity is generally omitted altogether – 
which deters later implementation.
Finding 15:  The time constraints were particularly 
difficult for many community groups because of the 
rush for support but also because of the concern that 
long-term engagement and a discussion of needs 
in the communities would not be possible. Despite 
this, most community groups willingly participated 
with an understanding of the potential benefits that 
would come from award. The primary exception to 
this sentiment was members of citizens’ groups 
concerned with the execution of Sandy recovery 
efforts unrelated to RBD.
Finding 16:  Most design teams relied on tried-
and-true techniques for community engagement 
given the time and resource constraints. However, 
a few activities were particularly inventive within 
the variety of RBD community engagement events, 
workshops, charrettes, and outreach activities. The 
“Scale It Up” events--designed to promote RBD and 
resilience awareness--were particularly notable. 
Online and social media engagement strategies 
the design teams employed in reaching community 
groups and general citizens were also creative, 
though only partially successful due to the time and 
resource constraints.   
Finding 17:  Ultimately, the community groups are 
mostly interested in the final outcomes of awards 
and the potential to continue engagement that will 
inform the designs while benefitting the commu-
nities. This sentiment was echoed by members of 
the media, who noted that benchmarks and actual-
ized projects will be the primary interest among the 
general public.
4.2. Activities
Both the RBD management team, particularly 
through the Stage 3 support partners, and the in-
dividual design teams embarked on community en-
gagement and participation efforts.
RBD management team 
The Stage 3 support partners were identified early 
on as the lead organizations for engagement activi-
ties. In particular, MAS was identified as the group 
that would “assemble contact lists of diverse stake-
holders in New York City neighborhoods affected by 
Sandy, including community leadership and local 
recovery groups,” based on its experiences with 
convening Resilience Roundtables. RPA would assist 
in identifying community stakeholders from the 
broader region, as well. VAI also would play a critical 
role – given its expertise in innovative community 
engagement strategies developed through the 
hiring of community design organizer, Jerome Chou 
– particularly for the planned Scale It Up efforts, as 
well as the general information and public relations 
campaign associated with the website and visual 
identity of public events.
Despite the expectations, much of the support 
partners’ work focused on managing the sheer 
quantity of logistics for these activities over the 
substance of their execution. While the support 
partners assisted with early community contacts, 
they often became assistants to the design teams 
who, according to many team leads, “did most of the 
thinking on events ourselves.” With the additional 
complication of funding for community groups that 
committed to participate in design team outreach, 
the myriad operational requirements expanded. 
This further decreased the opportunity for additional 
reflection on engagement activities. The procure-
ment of an external public relations firm limited the 
support partners’ internal commitments to engage 
public campaigns and broad media strategies. 
Combined with the lost opportunity for harnessing 
the website and other online media for engagement, 
the public engagement opportunities for the RBD 
teams were strictly limited to assisting design teams 
33T H E  E VA L U A T I O N  O F  T H E  D E S I G N  C O M P E T I T I O N  O F  R E B U I L D  B Y  D E S I G N
over a tight timeframe that was effectively less than 
three months long.
Design teams 
During Stage 2, IPK and RBD staff organized activi-
ties to encourage inter-team collaboration and en-
gagement with community stakeholders. 
Site visit agendas. Setting up site visits gave design 
teams the opportunity to see the communities 
impacted by Hurricane Sandy, giving them first-
hand insight into communities’ vulnerabilities, op-
portunities and values. At each of the site visits, IPK 
and RBD staff organized meetings with city leaders, 
including mayors and staff from city/town agencies 
and community-based organizations. Several of 
these site visits were accompanied by community 
lunches, enabling design teams and RBD organizers 
to interact informally with residents. 
RBD research advisors and other experts provided 
additional context, highlighting different issues for 
each of the site visits, such as wastewater treatment, 
emergency response, housing or economic develop-
ment. The design teams completed five regional 
meetings – Lower Manhattan, New Jersey Shore, 
Staten Island and Jamaica Bay, Long Island and 
Bridgeport – each of which ended with a public event, 
where design teams met with community members 
in small group sessions, workshops or open fora. The 
design teams also had an optional tour to visit post-
Hurricane Katrina New Orleans, which all ten teams 
chose. 
Community event requirements. In Stage 3, 
design teams were required to organize at least 
two community events: an initial event to put 
forth design concepts for criticism and input, and 
a second event to demonstrate how the design 
concepts responded to the input. Many of the teams 
organized more than the two required events, in 
order to increase community buy-in and awareness 
and also because weather and the rapid pace of the 
RBD process sometimes made it difficult to populate 
events. Some design teams had the advantage of 
existing contacts held by management or support 
partner staff prior to RBD. Many set up informational 
events with panelists (e.g. WXY’s Finance Colloquia) 
or traditional design charrettes. HR&A was able to 
combine its RBD community outreach with events 
held for the New York Rising Community Reconstruc-
tion Program, the state’s post-Sandy community 
participation program. 
Contact with community groups. Design teams 
varied in their interpretation of the purpose of 
community engagement, from “rally[ing] support 
and confirm[ing] designs” to receiving community 
feedback on design concepts to assessing long-ex-
isting community needs in detail. This interpreta-
tion generally correlated with the presence of active 
community organizations in the specific sites, while 
sites with minimal pre-existing community groups 
focused on making community presentations.  
Those with a few active citizens held charrettes, 
while those with many active organizations and 
activists held multiple and extensive discussions. 
Some of the teams expressed the need for RBD to 
be more flexible regarding community definitions 
and meeting requirements, such as HR&A’s focus 
on business communities and WXY’s interest in 
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fostering a community of activist scientists. Most 
teams also developed informal contacts with local 
groups. Community groups noted having multiple 
meetings or phone conversations with design teams 
throughout Stage 3 for teams’ better understanding 
of the community.
Attendance at group meetings. In almost all cases, 
the teams put on events, sent out invitations and 
developed input strategies on their own. Design 
teams noted that they were not all clear on how en-
gagement would be used or what its later purpose 
was. As a consequence, they often made decisions 
themselves regarding focusing on design feedback, 
resilience awareness, community organizing or 
even hiring their own community liaisons. In some 
cases, the seasonal timing of RBD (for example, 
reduced populations in New Jersey beach communi-
ties during the winter months) hindered significant 
turnout and attention. The holidays further compli-
cated the attempts to engage communities.
Diversity of organizations and events. The 
community organizations were diverse in terms of 
geography, mission and involvement in other post-
Sandy projects. Their geographic coverage areas 
ranged from one street to the entire city, although 
most often, they represented single or multiple con-
tiguous neighborhoods. Many of the groups were 
civic associations whose members were residents 
of the area. While most organizations were not spe-
cifically focused on the environment, some had en-
vironment-related missions, such as river cleanup or 
sustainability promotion, while others represented 
businesses in the area or were economic develop-
ment corporations. A majority of the community 
organizations that responded were involved in other 
major post-Sandy efforts, such as New York Rising or 
SIRR.   
Organized by the RBD support partner VAI, Scale It 
Up provided less conventional opportunities for RBD 
staff and design teams to engage with the public and 
educate community members about RBD and resil-
ience. Overall, the design teams, and RBD and its 
support partners organized at least 37 public events 
and meetings – ranging from a bike tour and parade 
to an art program and a celebration of resilience.  
Team research. During Stage 2, when design teams 
were still conducting their own research into the 
region’s main issues, and design work plans were 
very much in their infancy, state and city-sponsored 
post-Sandy-related community engagement activi-
ties such as New York Rising were occurring simul-
taneously. Thus, in an effort to minimize “resilience 
fatigue” and manage expectations among residents 
and community organizations, RBD staff discouraged 
design teams from conducting their own outreach 
with local stakeholders at that time. However, in 
Stage 3, design teams were tasked with demonstrat-
ing that their designs were implementable, and with 
convincing CDBG-DR grantees to support the design 
interventions, particularly through incorporating 
public participation in the RBD process. The public 
participation requirement was met through formal, 
often public events hosted by the design teams with 
the help of RBD staff and its partners. 
4.3. Outputs
On the whole, stakeholders noted key challenges in 
RBD’s community engagement strategy.  
Short time frame. The first challenge involved the 
simple logistics of raising awareness and subsequent 
The community organizations were 
diverse in terms of geography, mission and 
involvement in other post-Sandy projects. 
Their geographic coverage areas ranged 
from one street to the entire city, although 
most often, they represented single or 
multiple contiguous neighborhoods.
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attendance at events within the short timeframe. As 
one community group stakeholder noted, “I don’t 
see how anyone can come up with a solution in six 
months to a problem we face for the next 50 years.” 
Many design teams felt that this speed was the 
reason for smaller turnout at events: “requests didn’t 
allow for thoughtful comment and led to confusion 
about the purpose of engagement.” 
One engagement expert familiar with the RBD teams 
noted that the fast timeframe could be perceived 
as “not being a deep enough dive,” leading com-
munities to view the engagement as conspiratorial 
at worst and consultative at best. One of the more 
involved community groups explicitly found the RBD 
design team engagement as more consultative than 
participatory. Events themselves were described as 
“fairly conventional,” “typical urban charrettes,” and 
“pretty standard” by groups that were supportive of 
their RBD design teams. Funders and other stake-
holders noted their concerns regarding the robust-
ness of participation – leading to the creation of a 
separate pool of funds for groups. 
Disaster fatigue. Some design teams and other 
stakeholders worried about exhausting commu-
nities already experiencing “disaster fatigue,” 
or creating false expectations among communi-
ties about the tentative nature of RBD projects. 
However, most community groups did not see 
either of these concerns as being prevalent: “We’re 
big boys and girls and understand that this is a com-
petition.” As such, and despite the timing challeng-
es, all design teams successfully held community 
events along with many other strategies in their 
designated communities. A few teams hired or 
appointed a team member to serve as a community 
liaison, leading to clear additional support from the 
local groups. 
Community perceptions 
Most community organizations agreed that there 
were limitations, explicitly noting that the process 
was rushed, not deep and somewhat perfunctory. 
However, the groups were grateful that community 
participation was even included in the RBD process. 
They understood the constraints and were willing 
to participate and support regardless. As one group 
director noted, “we knew what we were getting 
into.” Their primary criticism was logistical – that 
they should have been involved earlier to help define 
the problem and engaged more robustly in order to 
take as much advantage of the limited timeframe as 
possible.
Overall, the organizations interviewed had positive 
feedback about the community engagement effort 
and felt that community participation was of great 
importance to RBD. However, a few noted that 
the level and quality of engagement varied by 
team. One respondent felt that the only difference 
between RBD and other development projects in 
terms of community engagement was that RBD 
had a shorter time frame, while another observed 
that RBD’s community engagement component 
was more meaningful than that of other develop-
ment projects only because the conversations were 
localized.
Respondents highlighted a number of features of 
the community outreach effort that made it particu-
larly useful, especially that community engagement 
was an ongoing and intensive process. A few respon-
dents said that their design team asked for feedback 
from them and the community multiple times and at 
different points in the process, with one comment-
ing that the design team was “very thorough in their 
The groups were grateful that community 
participation was even included in the RBD 
process. They understood the constraints 
and were willing to participate and support 
regardless. As one group director noted, 
“we knew what we were getting into.” 
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approach, more so than other groups have been in 
the past.” Although the design teams provided many 
opportunities for the community to learn about the 
projects and give their feedback in a short frame of 
time, one respondent observed that “longer term 
processes [would be] more successful in getting 
more feedback” and capturing feedback more 
formally.
The brevity and intensity of the community outreach 
effort complemented the design teams’ responsive 
approach. Organizations felt that the design process 
was a “two-way dialogue.” In one location, where the 
design process was collaborative from the beginning, 
a respondent remarked that “people were taken 
aback” by the invitation for input at such an early 
stage because it was “not typical with development 
projects,” that in fact, usually “come in with a pretty 
rendering of what they want to build.” 
One respondent said that the design team “was 
unusually responsive to the feedback” it received 
from residents, nonprofit organizations and business 
representatives. Multiple respondents noticed that 
design teams incorporated feedback they received 
on a presentation into their subsequent presenta-
tions. One organization said the design team intro-
duced the community to ideas from around the world 
and, in turn, incorporated community voices so that 
the imported ideas “took on a local flavor.”
Another successful feature of the community en-
gagement effort was that design teams sought 
feedback from many different segments of the 
community. One engagement event had attendees 
discuss the science behind the proposal and involved 
teachers and children which, according to one re-
spondent, “really made it a community effort 
in a great way.” In another location, the design 
team sought feedback from business interests 
and residents through community engagement 
events that created “synergy between business and 
residents,” which, according to one respondent, 
“doesn’t happen very often here.” 
One respondent reported that rather than only 
seeking input from organizations and community 
representatives, the design team sought feedback 
from individuals themselves. According to that re-
spondent, prior to RBD, there had never been “this 
broad of an outreach effort to get the guy on the 
street’s input.” Many community groups saw RBD as 
an additional resource opportunity for their ongoing 
missions or their Sandy-specific projects (including a 
few New York Rising efforts).
On the whole, these events followed traditional 
community presentations and urban charrettes. 
All of the groups involved noted that they had 
sponsored similar events prior to Sandy and for 
other development or community-based projects. 
Examples of more innovative engagement methods 
include the Scale It Up events, including an Asbury 
Park parade, Bridgeport tours and Staten Island 
manuals. Expertise from VAI staff was particularly 
noted, but the design teams’ own creativity and 
commitments to the communities led to these ex-
ceptional events.
Some community groups that did not participate 
actively in RBD expressed concern about RBD’s focus 
on infrastructure design projects when other critical 
major resilience and recovery issues had not been 
addressed. This sentiment was exacerbated by the 
fact that so many other post-Sandy recovery efforts 
had not been well implemented – leaving a “gap” 
between current recovery and RBD’s “castles in the 
A number of the community organizations 
had a longstanding history of 
redevelopment, community development 
and social/environmental justice work 
in the communities. For many of them, 
Hurricane Sandy expanded their scope of 
work, compelling them to “rethink” their 
work through resilience lenses. 
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sky.” Some individual citizens even thought RBD was 
a FEMA program.
Design development
Through formal and informal activities, RBD staff 
and design teams provided community leaders and 
residents with multiple venues to share community 
concerns, learn about proposed design interventions 
and provide feedback. A number of the community 
organizations had a longstanding history of rede-
velopment, community development and social/
environmental justice work in the communities. 
For many of them, Hurricane Sandy expanded their 
scope of work, compelling them to “rethink” their 
work through resilience lenses. 
Community organizations learned about RBD by word 
of mouth or through direct contact with RBD admin-
istrative staff, research advisors and design teams 
that were familiar with the community group through 
past collaborations or events. Residents learned of 
RBD activities through outreach conducted by RBD 
staff and design teams, or assisting community or-
ganizations. In Stage 2, community engagement 
had occurred through formal events designed by 
RBD staff and IPK but, in Stage 3, each design team 
embarked on its own strategy for further engage-
ment and eventual explicit support from community 
organizations. 
Funding allotment. RBD supported the allotment 
of funds to support community organizations of the 
design teams’ choice. Through the additional pool 
of funds provided by the philanthropic partners, 
each team was eligible for approximately $25,000 
in funds to be used for the logistical costs of events 
and for subgranting among local community orga-
nizations. The subgrants, commonly $5,000 mi-
crogrants, were given to community organizations 
to conduct outreach and promote public participa-
tion, specifically targeting stakeholders tradition-
ally removed from public participation processes. 
Motivated by their own mission to improve commu-
nities, many of the organizations receiving micro-
grants volunteered more services than the micro-
grant supported. 
Community events. Based on observations at 
public events and interviews with key informants, 
the community events organized by design teams 
were often standard neighborhood design char-
rettes or planning events, typically presenting an 
overview of the RBD process (sometimes with the 
assistance of RBD staff), small workgroups where 
participants, RBD staff and design teams explained 
or collected feedback, a final overview of takeaways 
from community desires/priorities, and a question-
and-answer session. 
Time and capacity pressure. The expeditious 
process placed intense time and capacity pressure 
on community organizations to conduct outreach in 
a very short period of time. Several community or-
ganizers wished they could have conducted a more 
intense effort in reaching out to residents. Moreover, 
the technical nature of the topics discussed, such 
as flood protection plans or green infrastructure, as 
well as the design interventions, required education 
for both the community organizations helping with 
outreach and the general public. Again, the intense 
time period only permitted abridged educational op-
portunities. The speed of the process also affected 
public participation. 
Community feedback.  Some stakeholders observed 
that public participation activities were in the 
middle spectrum of the “ladder of engagement,” 
so members of the public were more often than not 
consulting and providing feedback, as opposed to a 
more empowered and enfranchised role in the RBD 
process. Nevertheless, some observers appreci-
ated that some design teams explicitly incorporated 
community feedback into their design, e.g. “Part of 
the challenge is that part of the community is not 
knowledgeable about the technology or ecology and 
don’t understand what it takes to make these in-
terventions happen. The teams have done the best 
they could to explain the options.” Many community 
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groups noted that design teams significantly changed 
some elements of the initial design proposals as a 
result of community input: “I felt heard.”
Even with the large size of the available staff, the 
engagement between RBD support partners and 
design teams was uneven. Some support partner 
staff members were more involved than others.
Media coverage
RBD generally prohibited individual design teams 
from speaking to the press, although some excep-
tions occurred towards the end of Stage 3 (Associ-
ated Press, 2014). Despite the centralized control, 
RBD received fairly extensive press coverage from a 
range of outlets including local and national news-
papers, television, radio and online blogs (Associat-
ed Press, 2013; Gregory, 2013; Shorto, 2014). Many 
press articles came from direct personal contact 
between a journalist and an RBD stakeholder (such 
as Ovink or a funder), while others came from 
journalists who simply covered community events 
as part of their local beat or were working on an 
ongoing post-Sandy series. In almost all cases, the 
coverage was positive.
Scope of coverage. The evaluation team inter-
viewed several informants representing various 
media outlets, including print journalism, online 
newspapers and radio. Media outlets that have 
covered Hurricane Sandy fall into six main catego-
ries: national popular press (e.g. New York Times, 
CNN); national trade press for specific industries 
or topics (e.g. Atlantic Cities, Next City); regional 
popular press (e.g. Long Island Herald, WHYY); 
local popular press (e.g. Asbury Park Press); local 
blogs (New Jersey Shore Hurricane News Facebook 
page); and niche press (e.g. Curbed). RBD staff, 
partners and design teams often made themselves 
available for interviews and information sharing 
with reporters.
Communication strategy. A public relations firm was 
hired as part of Stage 3 to develop a communica-
tions strategy, conduct media outreach and distrib-
ute materials such as images and press releases. 
RBD successfully implemented the recommended 
communication tactic of “taking advantage of mile-
stones” (SKD, 2013), such as media coverage of 
the announcement of the design competition, the 
selection of the ten design teams that would proceed 
to Stage 2, the unveiling of the ten design opportuni-
ties that would be further developed in Stage 3, and 
the final design proposals presented to the public and 
RBD on April 3, 2014. Some reporters also attended 
community events to cover the event or to research 
longer articles for the milestone events.
Journalists’ focus. Several local news outlets were 
devoted to Sandy-related stories since many of 
their readers were affected by Hurricane Sandy. 
Naturally, many of these reporters were eager to 
learn more about RBD, particularly about specific 
design proposals for communities in their coverage 
areas. RBD’s narrative stood out from other San-
dy-related stories. In addition, while much of the 
post-Sandy news was about immediate or short-
term rebuilding efforts at the local level, RBD was 
focused on long-term resilience, an angle that many 
reporters found intriguing. However, the fact that 
design teams were focused on research and analysis 
during much of RBD’s process, meant journalists did 
not have tangible designs to report on until the later 
stages of RBD. At the same time, editors and writers 
were also concerned about the logic, appeal and im-
plications of reporting on design concepts that might 
not come to fruition.  
Even though RBD’s public relations 
consultants helped create a 
communications strategy and developed 
talking points, interviews with key staff 
suggested that there was still insufficient 
staff capacity for media outreach and 
relations. 
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Lack of clear understanding. Some reporters 
expressed a desire for clearer communication of 
design proposals, the design competition and the 
funding mechanism, CDBG-DR, so they could better 
translate technical terms and concepts for a general 
audience. According to many reporters, the pre-
sentations and renderings often provided attractive 
visuals and compelling narratives, but the potential 
impact of the projects was sometimes difficult 
to convey. The challenge was translating RBD’s 
abstract designs and architectural concepts to a level 
understandable by audiences that are less or not at 
all familiar with architecture or resilience terms.
Even though RBD’s public relations consultants 
helped create a communications strategy and 
developed talking points, interviews with key staff 
suggested that there was still insufficient staff 
capacity for media outreach and relations. The rapid 
pace of the design competition also affected website 
production, creating a web resource that many, 
including reporters and RBD staff, found unintuitive 
and counterproductive to public participation.
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Implementation activities  
and outputs
This chapter describes obstacles to the Phase II im-
plementation of RBD projects and provides specifics 
about formal and informal actions taken to facilitate 
the transition from design concept to shovel-ready 
project. Phase 1: Stage 3 was meant to identify 
barriers to implementation. RBD leadership and staff 
had worked with design teams throughout Phase I 
to anticipate and begin addressing potential barriers 
to implementation – a critical step towards realizing 
the projects. The specifics of Stage 3 provided a clear 
departure from the open-ended inquiry and design 
conceptualization of Stages 1 and 2. 
In spite of the anticipation of potential barriers, the 
transition into Stage 3 (project development and 
community engagement) was strenuous for many 
stakeholders, not just the ten design teams. Stage 3 
involved an evolving directive to quickly and effective-
ly generate projects that were physically, financially 
and politically feasible, while based on concepts that 
had only been developed a few weeks earlier. 
For the design teams, this final development stage 
tempered some of the early thinking about design 
solutions to resilience challenges in both produc-
tive and ineffective ways. Support from CDBG-DR 
grantees was also influenced by the trade-offs 
grantees would have to make with other expendi-
tures they wanted for non-RBD designs. As such, 
some grantees were hesitant to speak vocally or 
show support for RBD designs without having more 
information. 
With the transition, many of these constraints were 
inevitable and, according to some stakeholders, 
entirely expected. Despite them, RBD made a mark 
across all of the areas targeted by the core partners, 
even for those stakeholders that had either curtailed 
their expectations or delayed judgment. 
5.1. Findings
Key findings regarding the implementation aspects 
of RBD’s Phase I include:
Finding 18:  RBD’s inclusion of specific implementa-
tion planning and feasibility requirements is an in-
novative approach to design competitions. Typical 
competitions for actual developments have pre-
determined all of the implementation issues prior 
to issuing a call, while curated competitions do not 
address the issues at all.
5
T H E  E VA L U A T I O N  O F  T H E  D E S I G N  C O M P E T I T I O N  O F  R E B U I L D  B Y  D E S I G N42
Finding 19:  RBD set out a novel relationship among 
federal, state and local governments in which 
federal resources are used in a way that meant 
national thinkers could address local problems. Sig-
nificant efforts were made on the part of the core 
RBD partners to introduce, negotiate and come to 
resolution on funding streams and appropriations 
between these public entities.  
As with other contextual factors around RBD, several 
key challenges faced in Phase I will likely persist in 
Phase II. 
Finding 20:  The nature of HUD funding regulations 
and protocols for the eventual award has proven to 
be a significant challenge in both obvious and more 
profound ways. The immediate challenge from the 
use of CDBG-DR comes from the specific nature of 
the funds’ obligation and subsequent implementa-
tion. Typically, CDBG-DR grantees propose their own 
activities for HUD’s approval and funding. In RBD, 
HUD played an obviously heavier role in helping to 
define the activities. Though flexible compared to 
almost all other federal disaster fund programs, 
CDBG-DR still involves regulated processes that 
prescribe any outlays from the federal government.
Finding 21:  Related procedural constraints included 
determining:
• the appropriate type of cost estimates and cost-
benefit analyses
• the eligible grantees’ individual procurement reg-
ulations after receipt of funds that may preclude 
sole-source contracting with the original design 
teams
• remaining national and local regulatory assess-
ments and  approvals 
• the persistent demands among the local and 
state governments for other Sandy-related 
recovery efforts that may compete with RBD 
projects for attention and resources.
A review of the activities and outputs related to im-
plementation yield two critical overarching recom-
mendations for the Phase II activities as well as for 
setting the context for replication of the RBD vision 
and processes.  
• Continued investment is needed during the im-
plementation phase to ensure that RBD’s current 
design projects remain innovative, that commu-
nities remain engaged, and that the wealth of 
knowledge gained from Phase I is gathered and 
sustained.  
• Advocacy regarding regional resilience funds is 
needed to ensure that the lessons from RBD are 
institutionalized. RBD presents a unique oppor-
tunity to consider how public entities respond to 
and provide resources for regional problems that 
exist beyond the boundaries of individual juris-
dictions. 
5.2. Activities
Many jurisdictions had preexisting strategies for 
resilient recovery, such as New York City’s Special 
Initiative on Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR) 
and New York State’s New York Rising grassroots 
outreach plans, in addition to having multiple plans 
for rebuilding as proposed in CDBG-DR Action Plans 
(Fischbach et al., 2014). Several jurisdictions had 
long-term regional and local planning efforts into 
which resilience could squarely fit (New York-New 
Jersey Harbor Estuary Program, 1996; NYS 2100 
Commission, 2013). 
Some of the RBD jurisdictions, such as Bridgeport 
and Ocean County, were undergoing scheduled 
master planning processes during the course of RBD 
or were soon to embark on them, while other entities 
were reconsidering planning or municipal opera-
tions (such as revising tax sharing agreements with 
other jurisdictions). In all cases, all of these cities 
Design teams struggled with defining 
how much of the pool of funds could be 
reasonably applied to their projects. They 
wanted to define their project scopes.
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have plans, activities and programs that existed well 
before RBD, particularly in relation to Sandy. In these 
places, RBD was charged with proposing designs and 
convincing officials of their worth.
RBD management
Generally, RBD staff and design teams prepared for 
implementation in the following ways: 
• arranging for meetings with key local officials to 
get informal support
• identifying and seeking out other officials and 
agencies that would need to be involved in formal 
and informal development approvals during im-
plementation 
• identifying the regulations that would shape 
designs and the regulatory processes that 
needed to be addressed during design approvals
• introducing the projects to key community orga-
nizations and building support
• familiarizing the general public with the projects.
These activities were intended to help design teams 
overcome major obstacles to successful implemen-
tation, including state and local procurement regu-
lations, the need for further design development, 
navigation of the permitting and zoning process, lack 
of reliable benefit-cost analyses (BCA), need for ad-
ditional funding sources and identification of policy 
issues. Some activities were more substantive than 
others, and many design teams felt that RBD’s role 
in identifying contacts varied by project.  
In addition to helping identify and contact local poli-
cymakers, the RBD team contributed to implemen-
tation planning by clarifying the use of CDBG-DR 
funds. In a January 2014 legal opinion, HUD clarified 
its own authority to retain a pool of the funds for RBD 
projects. RBD had kept project scope and problem 
statements broad to catalyze out-of-the-box 
designs unimpeded by constraints. Yet, it also had to 
do so because it simply did not know the amount of 
CDBG-DR funds that would be available. 
Yet even before the legal opinion was issued, design 
teams struggled with defining how much of the pool 
of funds could be reasonably applied to their projects. 
They wanted to define their project scopes. Early in 
Stage 3, HUD attempted to give general ranges of 
possible scope funds, and encouraged the design 
teams to divide their projects into phases. Yet, as 
with other aspects of the Stage 3 pivot to feasibility 
planning, the scope was still unclear to both design 
teams that were grappling with right-sizing their 
ambitions and the implementing eligible grantees 
that still felt uncomfortable with perceived outlays 
to unknown commodities.
Design teams
For the design teams, the transition to Stage 3 also 
meant regular (or, in some cases, “endless”) meetings 
with selected sites’ policymakers in the hope of 
receiving support commitments. Many design teams 
had happily delayed this activity, noting that they 
were “purposely trying to avoid politicians early on 
because they skew expectations.” Though RBD staff 
told design teams from the beginning that anything 
they did “would be more than CDBG grantees do 
now” with regard to action plan statements, gaining 
local and community support as a requisite exceeded 
traditional requirements. Yet, the local officials had 
trepidations. With concerns about pulling CDBG-DR 
funds as well as their limited capacity in post-Sandy 
conditions, many of the jurisdictions in question had 
been reticent to participate with RBD teams. Others, 
that had identified RBD as both the funding and 
resilient opportunity it is, were far more open.  
In some cases, this engagement was seamless and 
the design teams were met by supportive mayors and 
county executives, council members and city offices, 
and, when existing, regional governmental organiza-
tion. These groups have noted two critical actions: i) 
that the design teams were “well prepared” and “had 
done their homework” towards presenting concepts 
that were compelling, and ii) that the RBD process 
had informed or would inform master planning or 
special planning efforts in those jurisdictions. 
In essence, RBD helped many local policymakers 
better understand their resilience challenge, gauge 
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opportunities for resilience and leverage current 
public planning efforts. While design teams con-
sidered the commitments required to get buy-in 
within such short timeframes to be excessive and ex-
hausting, many local officials (at least among those 
who were actively engaged and participating) felt 
the compressed timeframe was actually helpful in 
making the support request more urgent and cutting 
through red tape. However, other local governmen-
tal entities were less engaged and forthcoming and 
their representatives were often unavailable for in-
terviews for this evaluation. 
RBD introduced another strategy for gaining this 
approval – developing cost estimates and BCA – 
as a requirement early in Stage 3 (approximately 
November 2013) but received significant focus and 
technical assistance in February and March, which 
were the final months of Phase I. The design teams 
viewed this requirement as particularly onerous 
because the design projects exist in a preliminary 
state with innovative scopes for which costs are 
difficult to assess. 
Further, RBD gave insufficient guidance about 
key assumptions for monetizing benefits as well 
as a clear structure or purpose for the benefit-cost 
ratio that would enable cross-project comparisons. 
Despite this concern, several federal stakeholders 
noted that understanding of costs would be critical 
to moving projects forward and some said the re-
quirement should have been introduced earlier. 
Numerous other activities were requested as part 
of the implementation planning, including develop-
ing feasibility plans, understanding procurement 
concerns among grantees, and identifying potential 
regulatory barriers and other funds sources. In short, 
the design teams were charged with preliminary, 
comprehensive development plans.
5.3. Outputs
Design development
Design teams acknowledge that, even at the end of 
Phase 1, their projects will require further refinement 
and development. All of the projects are several steps 
away from construction, and funding from any public 
agencies generally requires that projects be in more 
advanced stages of development. Project sites must 
go through extensive feasibility studies, surveying, 
title work, costing, environmental studies and geo-
logical studies (such as soils analysis), among other 
things, before they are shovel ready. Several teams 
may be better equipped than others to address these 
issues, since their members include coastal and in-
frastructure engineers. 
RBD made tentative steps to address these issues 
during the federal workshop held at the end of Stage 
3. The Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) presented at 
the workshop, and one of its engineers served as 
a consultant to design teams throughout Phase 1 
(only two teams followed up with ACE about imple-
mentation issues). Further design development will 
likely lead to significant project changes, but also will 
require additional funding from uncertain sources. 
While philanthropy has been suggested as a potential 
funding source, it is unclear whether potential donors 
have been approached in this manner.
In the meantime, several local officials (especially 
those in technical offices) still have concerns about 
engineering quality but are waiting for further design 
development and the permitting processes. Despite 
their projects’ current limitations, many local officials 
expressed gratitude for the professional guidance 
regardless, and expressed interest in pursuing the 
projects at least in concept if their respective teams 
were not selected for final award.
Benefit-cost analysis
At the outset, design teams were not clear as to 
whether they would be responsible for performing 
BCAs of their projects. They considered the BCA re-
quirement an afterthought – one added to their list of 
required deliverables partway through the process. 
In reality, BCAs are critically important for the devel-
opment of implementation plans, but they require 
intensive resources (for example, firms typically hire 
cost estimators) and standardized assumptions for 
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comparability. BCAs that cannot be compared across 
teams might obscure the lines that separate projects 
that look good from projects that look good but also 
have a chance of being realized.
On February 18 – slightly more than one month 
before final design submissions were due – RBD 
leadership held a BCA workshop in New York, inviting 
representatives from FEMA and several firms with 
BCA experience to present an overview and dem-
onstration of BCAs. At the workshop, several tools 
were presented, something that might have proven 
confusing to design teams with little BCA experience. 
Moreover, RBD offered no guidance at the time about 
basic standards that should be used for cost estima-
tion. Dutch firms Rebel and Deltares were asked to 
provide a more uniform framework that was more 
appropriate to the proposed design opportunities. 
Teams and jury members noted that this guidance 
provided some consistency in terms, but many core 
parameters were still unclear. Ultimately, this meant 
that teams developed many of their own assump-
tions, which contributed to comparability challenges 
in BCA ratios at the final presentation. Cost compari-
sons will be an ongoing challenge as plans, and their 
projected cost details, develop further.   
Procurement opportunities  
State and local procurement laws present sub-
stantial impediments to implementation. Govern-
ment spending decisions are bound by regulations 
designed to ensure that procedures are standard and 
consistent and applied in a fair and impartial manner. 
Once a design is selected as a winner, state and local 
procurement rules may delay implementation and, 
in an extreme case, may require lawmakers to open 
the project to a competitive bidding process or RFP. 
This last case has the potential result of preventing a 
winning design team from implementing its project. 
HUD foresaw these challenges during Phase I, and 
worked behind the scenes to develop potential 
solutions. For example, there are waivers, but they 
vary by state and locality, and are difficult to dem-
onstrate. By the end of Phase I, many local officials 
were still taking a “wait and see” approach, pushing 
off dealing with this issue until they knew whether 
their projects had been selected to move forward 
into Phase 2. While city councils and mayors have 
met with design teams, and in some cases, coordi-
nated joint meetings with state lawmakers, these 
meetings largely have been for the purposes of in-
formation sharing and securing general or formal 
letters of support. There has been little to no formal 
discussion of how design teams will address jurisdic-
tional procurement regulations beyond positioning 
themselves as likely contractors. Further, many local 
civil servants in the RBD communities in question 
have not heard of RBD, even among planning and 
zoning departments, suggesting complications in 
expediting local procurement.    
A central concern for design teams in these trans-
actions is the status of their intellectual property 
should state and municipal grantees receive the 
funds and go through open procurement. As noted 
in the Federal Register notice announcing RBD 
but not in the RFQ itself: “HUD may in its sole and 
absolute discretion choose to negotiate with any 
entrant to acquire, license, use or convey any other 
intellectual property developed in connection with 
this contest.” The grant agreements issued to each 
team in the fall of 2013 gave the federal government 
the legal option to exercise rights to the designs 
within 180 days after HUD awards. Assumedly, the 
exercise of this option will ensure that the original 
designs are shared with the local governmental 
entities and assist with the ongoing involvement of 
their design team creators.
Regulatory assessments
As with most urban development projects, RBD 
projects will face significant permitting and zoning 
challenges, including environmental impact assess-
ments. In the fall of 2013, RBD leadership began 
working with state and city officials to determine 
how to make them comfortable with RBD’s direction 
and to underscore how real projects would emerge 
from the process. In some cases, Secretary Donovan 
reached out to governors, mayors and other elected 
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officials. RBD staff also urged states to prioritize 
the projects they would like to see implemented 
and, in that way, line up relevant agencies. Design 
teams have been urged, though not very forcefully, 
to engage relevant agencies for, e.g. permitting 
and zoning, but this guidance has not been evenly 
followed by all design teams, especially since many 
of the projects were conceptual from the start. In all 
likelihood, the projects will alter significantly.     
During Phase 1, teams were directed by RBD leader-
ship to keep a running list of policy issues that they 
identified as barriers to implementation – a list which 
might include many of the topics listed above, such 
as zoning, permitting and funding. It is unclear what 
became of these lists and what purpose they will ul-
timately serve. 
Local commitments 
As noted earlier, several jurisdictions in question are 
at different stages of master planning in a post-San-
dy scenario. New York City had existing plans that 
referenced resilience strategies, while several others 
have master plans that are currently being rewritten. 
In three instances, local officials have said that RBD is 
helping inform their new plans with project specifics 
as well as by foregrounding resilience as a long-term 
development issue.  
Just as significantly, many of the jurisdictions are 
also grappling with other post-Sandy efforts and 
demands, including executing their homeowner re-
building programs from early CDBG-DR outlays (such 
as New York City’s Build It Back) and implement-
ing other planned needs (such as those identified 
by New York Rising committees). Other civil sector 
groups, including many environmental advocates, 
are also pushing for planned retreats rather than the 
proposed RBD alternatives.
Federal-local negotiations
The relationship between HUD and its CDBG 
grantees is a particularly complex one, though not 
operationally complex. For jurisdictions that view 
their funds as entitlements, the use of funds for ac-
tivities other than those they propose in their action 
plans is suspect. Jurisdictional boundaries and self-
interest, especially for those RBD projects working 
across multiple jurisdictions, complicates agree-
ments locally and in the search for HUD funding. The 
strength of home rule laws in New Jersey and New 
York hardens these positions. Due in large part to 
HUD’s efforts to communicate with state and local 
jurisdictions, many of the more difficult implementa-
tion challenges associated with local acceptance are 
currently being resolved.
According to one state stakeholder: “limited 
resources means being creative with funds.” Many 
jurisdictions have been open to, if cautious about, 
discussions with HUD. Federal stakeholders view 
these agreements as critical: “If everyone isn’t on 
board, then these aren’t going to happen, because 
we lose control once we say these are the winners 
and give the money.”  
Federal commitments and institutionalization
As noted by stakeholders who participated in post-
Katrina efforts, another key innovation of the post-
Sandy response has been making the central role 
of a federal coordinator that of a clearinghouse and 
“champion.” For Sandy, HUD has been the obvious 
champion, and it has filled this role with relative 
success. However, a key implementation activity 
and, eventually, output has been the solicitation of 
Many of the jurisdictions are also 
grappling with other post-Sandy efforts 
and demands, including executing their 
homeowner rebuilding programs from 
early CDBG-DR outlays (such as New York 
City’s Build It Back) and implementing 
other planned needs (such as those 
identified by New York Rising committees). 
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commitments from other federal sources of funds. 
Presumably, these efforts would yield institutional-
ization of funding or model duplication.
Recognizing the limitations of CDBG-DR funds, at the 
end of Stage 2, RBD organized a meeting between 
potential federal funders and design teams, with 
representatives from the Federal Transit Administra-
tion (FTA), FEMA and ACE, among other agencies. 
FEMA discussed its Hazard Mitigation Grant (HMG) 
program, which provides states with aid to rebuild 
following natural disaster. New York has used 
less than 10 percent of the roughly $800 million it 
received following Sandy, and still has plenty of funds 
available to allocate to relevant projects. 
The agency noted, however, that it is ultimately up to 
states to decide where and how they will use these 
funds. While FEMA has been involved in RBD, it does 
not have the ability to force states to fund local RBD 
projects. This may prove problematic since nine of 
the ten projects are located within specific localities, 
and it is unclear whether these localities have secured 
buy-in from states to dedicate specific funding pots 
to winning RBD projects.      
Other federal agents discussed potential sources 
of funds that design teams could apply for, though 
they would have to line up support from a grantee 
(a public authority, for example). Their funds are 
available only to projects with a transportation 
component. A representative noted that, recently, 
only one to two funding applications referenced 
the RBD process in their narrative applications for 
Sandy-specific discretionary funds. These officials 
noted that they cannot make commitments. The 
ACE, responsible for coastal preparations, sees 
RBD as an interesting pilot for innovation and has 
internal champions for both the RBD vision and a 
few individual teams. 
However, the vast majority of staff in that agency has 
pursued standard rebuilding engineering efforts in 
its 150 projects for the Sandy-affected area to date 
(ACE, 2013a; 2013b). Though many federal stake-
holders sympathize with RBD’s efforts: “80 percent 
of field staff know nothing about RBD and will not 
change their practices, 19 percent are staff who may 
be interested in RBD but have said or would say 
‘we’ll never do that,’ and only 1 percent are people 
like me who say ‘maybe.’” This attitude was reflected 
by another federal stakeholder who remarked: “It’s 
too soon to tell. We need to see the end result of the 
process ... Everyone’s withholding judgment.”
Within HUD, there is little evidence of ongoing 
commitments beyond the currently negotiated 
CDBG-DR funds. Typically, as noted by one disaster 
planning expert: “CDBG-DR is typically used for 
fairly conventional disaster recovery like home re-
building,” facility rebuilding and economic develop-
ment programs. Though the use of CDBG has been 
clarified and the eventual value of funds for RBD will 
be soon presented, the institutionalization of this 
kind of commitment is likely to end with this RBD 
unless additional championing occurs. 
The concept of resilience may be incorporated into 
other federal recovery and development efforts, 
but not with the kind of funding made available to 
RBD, as it is currently in the National Mitigation 
Framework drafted by FEMA. Other funds beyond 
CDBG-DR (such as traditional CDBG) could conceiv-
ably be utilized for other competitions, though there 
is likely less leadership interest in this. The use of 
CDBG-DR proved to be an innovation, but could ulti-
mately be an anomaly.
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6
Conclusion
Significant innovations are often the product of open-
ended problems, unrestricted methods of inquiry 
and imprecise goals. The processes employed in the 
RBD Phase I effort have been no exception. Referred 
to almost universally by stakeholders as “flying the 
plane as it is being built,” the RBD executive and ad-
ministrative team’s efforts to catalyze design teams’ 
innovations while exposing  them to environmental, 
regulatory, financial, political and social realities have 
resulted in many proposed advances for resilient in-
frastructure design in general and for Sandy-affect-
ed populations in particular. Moreover, the entire 
work was completed in less than ten months. 
Since its inception, RBD has intentionally blurred 
the lines between process and product innova-
tion and the realities of traditional infrastructure 
finance, design and development. In Stages 1 (team 
selection) and 2 (research), RBD harnessed the lack 
of parameters to generate open-ended questions 
and foster radical thinking about the real environ-
mental, social and economic challenges faced by 
Sandy-affected communities. While the final verdict 
on the projects – as well as their subsequent imple-
mentation and impacts compared with other resil-
ience strategies – is yet to be delivered, the products 
of Stage 3 (project development and community en-
gagement) have generated excitement.
With the exception of a few stakeholders who were 
either opposed to any recovery strategy beyond re-
building and those that are withholding judgment, 
almost all respondents were enthusiastic about the 
RBD vision and have been intrigued by the Phase 
I activities and output. All stakeholders appreci-
ate the amount of management effort that has 
gone into all of the components and the desire to 
include so many components (especially research, 
community participation and implementation 
planning) in design competitions. These activities 
also generate awareness regarding resilience chal-
lenges in the communities in question as well as the 
broader national discussion.
These achievements are notable and suggest that 
Phase I has moved RBD to preliminary outputs that 
Referred to almost universally by 
stakeholders as “flying the plane as it 
is being built,” the RBD executive and 
administrative team’s efforts to catalyze 
design teams’ innovations while exposing  
them to environmental, regulatory, 
financial, political and social realities have 
resulted in many proposed advances for 
resilient infrastructure design.
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could, with additional resources and efforts, produce 
outcomes. Yet, much more remains to be seen 
before those outcomes are realized and measured 
– not the least of which is preliminary funding. As a 
staff member of a key support partner noted, “How 
do you sustain innovation during implementation?” 
Indeed, how do you continue the networks for inno-
vation without the formal network, the intensity and 
the model of RBD?
6.1. Summary of findings
This formative evaluation collected significant 
volumes of data through document reviews, event 
observation and interviews with key stakeholders 
in order to assess whether RBD’s Phase I execution 
met the original RBD vision, and to gauge how RBD 
compares with other design competitions. This 
included analyzing the inputs and activities that 
could be classified as supporting factors or challeng-
es, as well as the ultimate outputs. 
Supporting factors
This review of RBD’s early model and developmen-
tal processes sheds light on several key factors that 
have clearly contributed to the innovative nature 
of outputs described above. Analysis of the data 
collected for the evaluation notes the following 
factors as being positive contributors to the Phase I 
outputs.
• HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan’s leadership and 
HUD’s resource commitment in the set-aside 
CDBG-DR (Finding 1). RBD pioneered the use 
of federal resources to provide “award” funds 
to a select group of projects that did not fit 
squarely within the designated funds’ traditional 
purposes. HUD’s innovative interpretation of 
CDBG-DR authority for potential use in awarding 
RBD design solutions for regional infrastructure 
projects departed from the traditional activities 
for which those funds had been used in post-
disaster scenarios, e.g. rebuilding of individual 
homes or public buildings or economic develop-
ment activities. 
• The charisma and vision of Henk Ovink, Senior 
Advisor to the Secretary and guiding hand for 
the design teams, was essential (Finding 2) . 
He promoted the vision and championed the 
entire effort between the teams and with the 
popular press. 
• Leveraged funds and guidance provided by 
key philanthropic partners were key determi-
nants (Finding 3). This was particularly the case 
with the Rockefeller Foundation, which has led 
work in resilience since well before RBD and 
the other ongoing funders of community-based 
organizations in the region. The JPB Founda-
tion’s involvement in resilience topics and com-
petition strategies was also critical, as was the 
knowledge of local community groups provided 
by other partners. This emerged as a unique pub-
lic-philanthropic partnership in which founda-
tions contributed resources for the competition-
related activities as well as knowledge of local 
community groups while government provided 
the “prize”. Beyond grant-funding contributions, 
though, this partnership also involved the com-
mitment of staff time and sharing the research 
and knowledge of local communities across or-
ganizational lines.
• RBD administrative team staff’s efficiency and 
grit in the face of tight schedules and with little 
to no pre-existing management plan played a 
key role (Finding 4). RBD produced an efficient, 
streamlined organization that managed the 
overall effort as well as detailed tasks with no 
preexisting blueprint while on a fixed schedule. 
The team’s responsiveness to information 
requests as well as flexibility in accommodating 
change was noted by all stakeholder groups. In 
forging a shared enterprise of individuals from 
government and with philanthropic resources, 
RBD demonstrated a nimble operation. 
• The self-interest and mission of the local officials 
and community groups and citizens that partici-
pated in and, in most cases, continue to support 
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RBD teams’ Phase I development was key 
(Finding 5, 17). This was a key input to the RBD 
process, but also demonstrated the community 
groups’ willingness to suspend disbelief about 
the funding ambiguity until awards were made. 
• The perseverance, goodwill and fundamental 
creativity of the design teams despite meager 
resources and often minimal familiarity with the 
competition “awards” or understanding of the 
scope of expectations at the project’s onset was 
an obvious contributing support to RBD’s com-
pletion (Finding 6). This support was consistent 
even during the most demanding times of RBD’s 
stages. 
• Broad academic and professional interest 
in RBD’s vision was critical (Finding 6). The 
interest of the architectural and engineering 
design community was particularly important 
for providing ongoing attention (especially when 
popular media interest was not there) and for 
ensuring an ongoing creative motive for the 
design teams’ participation. 
• RBD’s unique take on design competitions 
and prizes helped to continue generating this 
interest (Findings 8, 14, 18). Competitions and 
resulting prizes are tools used to procure the 
best output in the quickest and least expensive 
ways. In many ways, RBD demonstrates the best 
aspects of a design competition. It has produced 
a tremendous volume of juried design analysis 
and plans whose values far exceed the resources 
that were made available. In other ways, RBD 
improved upon traditional design competition 
by introducing research, public engagement and 
practical implementation stages often in collabo-
ration across the teams – three key opportunities 
and one framework that are uncommon in tradi-
tional competitions.
• RBD departed from traditional funding and 
management structures. The use of competi-
tions also departed from traditional practices 
in public funding and in public procurement, 
especially for capital projects (Finding 9, 19). 
The staffing, communications, legal agreements 
and monitoring typical of federal agencies are 
typically burdensome, highly regulated and 
lengthy, but also generally transparent and 
documented. Federal agencies increasingly use 
prizes and competitions due to the 2011 America 
COMPETES Act Reauthorization, though most 
of the design prizes related to building or infra-
structure design were student competitions or 
competitions for specific building technologies. 
In RBD’s case, this departure not only contrib-
uted to the state of competitions it also departed 
from traditional federal practice. 
 RBD set out a novel relationship among federal, 
state and local governments in which federal 
resources were used so that national thinkers 
could address local problems. This relationship-
building has also contributed a new chapter to 
the history of federal pursuit of design excellence 
which, until now, focused only on land develop-
ment and capital projects owned directly by the 
federal government. RBD, then, has added a 
federal incentive to design excellence in state 
and local projects. 
• RBD developed immediate organizational and 
management structures out of need as much as 
plan, if not more so (Finding 10). Beyond grant 
funding contributions, this partnership involved 
the commitment of staff time and sharing of 
RBD set out a novel relationship among 
federal, state and local governments 
in which federal resources were used 
so that national thinkers could address 
local problems. 
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knowledge of local communities across organi-
zational lines.
Challenges
The supporting factors combined to ensure that 
critical components of RBD’s aspirational vision were 
addressed to the maximum extent possible given the 
constraints. The following identifies constraints that 
challenged RBD stakeholders across Phase I. 
• The lack of precedents and preexisting plans for 
RBD led to changing and growing requirements 
for deliverables, participation in activities and, 
in some cases, reconfigured teams (Finding 11). 
For many stakeholders, including RBD manage-
ment staff itself, this uncharted territory con-
tributed additional stress to already demanding 
work. While RBD responded to this by providing 
multiple channels for design teams to access in-
formation, there were increased opportunities 
for communications slippages and, more exactly, 
varying interpretations of expected deliverables 
and of the ultimate post-jury award criteria. Lack 
of clarity also led to a hesitancy to participate 
in some communities, a few of which were also 
unfamiliar with broader resilience challenges or 
were concerned about the execution of other 
federal post-Sandy recovery efforts. 
• The compressed timeframe played a key chal-
lenging role (Findings 12, 15). In ten months, 
RBD accomplished activities across competition, 
research, design development, jurisdictional ne-
gotiations, media outreach and community en-
gagement – a process that typically would take 
a minimum of two years. The intensity was noted 
as taxing by all stakeholder groups and, in some 
cases, offsett some stakeholders’ wishes for 
longer-term community engagement. Paradoxi-
cally, this efficiency also yielded the expedited 
delivery of explicit support from many commu-
nities for the purposes of the final jury. Other 
benefits from the timeframe came in the form 
of the successful completion of deliverables by 
design teams and execution of tasks by federal 
agents, and of increased goodwill between 
design teams and their communities.
• Resource limitations were noted as contribut-
ing to RBD’s intensity (Finding 13). Available 
and expected resources played significant roles 
for the design teams in two distinct ways. First, 
the individual teams spent well past the allotted 
team grant funds, typically at a magnitude of 
three to six times over. Many teams accepted 
the short-term cost of participation in RBD as 
being recouped in benefits to their mid-term 
knowledge base and their long-term business 
development. Yet, the effects of this burden were 
felt disproportionately by smaller, non-univer-
sity-based design team members. Second, the 
indefinite value of the final award led to concerns 
about the fit for appropriate scopes in teams’ un-
dertakings. 
• Reliance on traditional practices, particularly 
with regard to community engagement, was 
a consequence of the time and resource con-
straints (Finding 16). Most design teams relied 
on tried-and-true techniques given the time 
and resource constraints. Several activities were 
particularly innovative within the variety of RBD 
community engagement events, workshops, 
charrettes and outreach activities. The Scale It 
Up events were particularly notable. Creative 
social media engagement strategies employed 
by the design teams in reaching community 
groups and general citizens were also partially 
successful due to the time and resource con-
straints.  
The design challenge that these 
implementation constraints posed has 
served as a collective tempering agent for 
RBD design innovations.
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• The nature of funding regulations and protocols 
for the eventual award has proven to be among 
the most significant challenges in both obvious 
and more profound ways (Finding 20). The 
immediate challenge from the use of CDBG-DR, 
for example, came from the specific burdens 
for funds obligation and subsequent implemen-
tation that these funds carry. These require-
ments resulted in the need to resolve practical 
issues, such as the negotiations with state and 
local entities to support and formally request 
projects for CDBG-DR funds for HUD’s approval 
and outlays, and soliciting legal opinion on HUD’s 
authority to designate appropriated funds for 
projects. 
 The design challenge that these implementa-
tion constraints posed has served as a collective 
tempering agent for RBD design innovations. 
For example, CDBG-DR funds are generally 
disbursed across individual political jurisdictions – 
not geographic regions or even areas with shared 
interests. RBD’s regional aspirations, then, have 
evolved into more site-specific projects. RBD 
projects, by design, are intended to become 
reality at some point. Yet, this realization process 
for RBD design teams has been shaped by the 
particular context of CDBG-DR funding and local, 
state and federal players involved.
• Related procedural constraints tied to both 
the CDBG-DR constraints but also to the need 
to expedite implementation plans were a final 
challenge (Finding 21). These included determin-
ing the appropriate type of cost estimates and 
cost-benefit analyses at early stages of design 
development, and the eligible grantees’ individu-
al procurement regulations after receipt of funds 
that may have precluded sole-source contracting 
with the original design teams. Though flexible 
compared with almost all other federal disaster 
fund programs, CDBG-DR still involves formal 
and regulated processes that pre-exist RBD and 
prescribe the outlays from the federal govern-
ment to jurisdictions.  
6.2. Phase II implementation
For teams whose CDBG-DR grantee supporters 
receive even partial funding for further design de-
velopment and project feasibility exploration, the 
real RBD work has only just begun. As RBD enters 
implementation, a central concern involves main-
taining the innovation in individual projects as they 
become further influenced by local regulatory, public 
participation and funding constraints. Indeed, Stage 
3 activities have already started to eliminate inter-
esting but impractical aspects of some of the designs 
though the projects are nowhere near contract 
document quality.  
Concerted and credible advocacy is needed to 
promote the original innovations and to continue 
the other innovative activities from Phase I. Ad-
ditional funding sources must be identified and 
rallied to bring the original innovations to reality, 
and resources and time must be allocated to create 
meaningful community engagement. These Phase 
II efforts require a keen knowledge of the current 
stakeholders and design teams. 
Capitalizing on as many of the individuals and 
activities from Phase I as possible is the most 
efficient option, including using Phase I manage-
ment staff. There also may be a need to identify 
other resources for well-defined projects rec-
ommended by the jury that do not receive HUD 
Without ongoing support, the long-term 
innovation from projects – along with 
RBD’s legacy – may be jeopardized. As 
significant spillover outputs from the work, 
these are as critical as the more obvious 
design solutions because of their potential 
for producing long-term sustained 
innovations where funding and leadership 
may not be available. 
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funding. Likewise, many other innovative outputs 
of Phase I – such as the research resources, the 
effective administration that maneuvers between 
public and philanthropic entities, and the collabor-
ative network of design teams – may also atrophy 
during implementation. 
Without ongoing support, the long-term innovation 
from projects – along with RBD’s legacy – may be 
jeopardized. As significant spillover outputs from the 
work, these are as critical as the more obvious design 
solutions because of their potential for producing 
long-term sustained innovations where funding and 
leadership may not be available.  Phase II provides an 
opportunity to apply the lessons learned from Phase 
I for the purpose of moving the projects towards suc-
cessful outcomes. This includes:
• establishing a long-term management plan that 
allots resources and sets milestones 
• defining future deliverables and progress with 
professional skill 
• maintaining communications with community 
groups in both awarded and declined communi-
ties to engage in a longer-term process of resil-
ience challenge definitions
• refining the public face of RBD and RBD projects 
through a revamped website, release of the 
various research reports including the final com-
pendium, and additional possible media and 
scholarly channels
• continuing to engage the philanthropic 
community for knowledge sharing, including 
contributing to their knowledge bases
• instituting goals and targets that are clear and 
based on resilience metrics in order to measure 
and compare RBD projects to other recovery 
efforts 
• convening the research advisory panel and  jurors 
periodically to further establish a state of the art, 
particularly with regard to implementation chal-
lenges  
• maintaining regular communications with the 
policymakers in question to better understand 
how resilience factors into their decision-making 
process 
• support and document the RBD design teams’ 
needs and progress
• perhaps most significantly, advocating for the rep-
lication of the RBD model in other circumstances 
as well as the institutionalization of funding 
streams such as the Obama administration’s 
proposed Resilience Fund to ensure that there are 
funding awards for future RBD design solutions.
In summarizing, this analysis offers the following 
recommendation for RBD Phase II. 
Recommendation 1:  Even after funding agreements 
are made, continued investment is needed during 
the implementation phase to ensure that RBD’s 
current design projects remain innovative, that 
communities remain engaged, and that the wealth 
of knowledge gained from Phase I is gathered and 
sustained. For individual design teams, the transition 
from concept to project is still occurring. Similarly, 
other priorities and obligations that state and local 
authorities face may compete with and impede the 
long-term attention needed for RBD projects.
6.3. Long-term replication and 
scalability  
There is discussion about replicating the RBD model 
in other resilience contexts given its apparent 
success in generating innovative design solutions 
and local attention. Replication of the RBD model 
is possible in different post-disaster conditions but 
Looking toward replication requires 
consciously considering how the context of 
the current RBD competition enabled many 
of the inputs to be accessed. In particular, 
RBD was designed in a post-disaster 
scenario in a global metropolis. 
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also in contexts with clear resilience challenges 
that have not experienced disasters or shocks in 
the immediate past. RBD’s original goals were as-
pirational. As such, there was much interest in how 
the vision could be employed in designed facilities 
beyond infrastructure such as housing, transporta-
tion or public spaces, and to other resilience topics 
beyond the built environment such as health, gov-
ernance or finance. 
As with all innovations and pilot efforts, adjustments 
in plans and activities are possible. Potential altera-
tions in future applications of the RBD model are both 
conceptual and managerial. For the former, multiple 
variations on the theme of early open-endedness 
that could make the implementation transition 
easier are imaginable. These could involve changing 
the timing of stages, preselecting sites and assigning 
competing teams. With regard to execution, RBD’s 
goals were not operational, yet milestones and deliv-
erables were met in spite of the ambiguity. However, 
the quantity of logistical and communication activi-
ties needed to execute them was massive. Having 
management staff, plans and clear parameters early 
could help reduce the intensity and provide opportu-
nity for content development.
Some RBD activities can become ongoing, fun-
damental resources that are deployable in indi-
vidual cases, such as research advisory groups, the 
network of federal agents, and the website and other 
technical resources. Others can be replicated with 
some adjustment, such as the solicitation and jury 
processes, the overall work plan and timeframe, and 
enlisting of site-specific management and support 
partners. However, if RBD is to be repeated, several 
activities and deliverables noted earlier in this dis-
cussion must be redesigned, such as the quality of 
community engagement; the transparency of com-
munications; and the resources and timing available 
overall for the teams. 
Looking toward replication requires consciously con-
sidering how the context of the current RBD com-
petition enabled many of the inputs to be accessed. 
In particular, RBD was designed in a post-disas-
ter scenario in a global metropolis that is among 
the world’s leading centers of architectural and 
design innovation with significant knowledge and 
financial resources, including a strong philanthropic 
community.  
However, two of the defining factors – the funding 
and the champions – are less replicable, even with the 
provision of supporting resources. The magnitude of 
funding provided by philanthropy to coordinate RBD 
innovative capacities and by the federal govern-
ment to award RBD innovations are explicitly tied to 
post-Sandy commitments and appropriations. The 
urgency of these may not exist in other contexts, 
particularly where a disaster has not recently struck. 
In the long-term, the model must also involve rep-
licating HUD’s commitment within other federal 
agencies. As for the champions, this is tied to two 
key individuals associated with the effort: HUD 
Secretary Shaun Donovan and Henk Ovink. Without 
their leadership and guidance, the urgency and spirit 
of goodwill may not be replicated. Regenerating or 
substituting for the financial supports in particular – 
in this case, the allocation of $1 billion in HUD disaster 
recovery funds – could prove beyond the reach of 
other cases in which replication is envisioned.
This analysis for RBD’s future replication or scaling is 
summarized in the following two recommendations.
Recommendation 2:  Replication of RBD processes 
is possible in different post-disaster conditions as 
well as in contexts with resilience challenges that 
have not experienced recent disasters. Some RBD 
activities – such as convening research advisors and 
websites – can be ongoing, fundamental resources 
to be deployed in other scenarios, while others – such 
as the solicitation and jury, timeframe and resources, 
and support partners – need adjustment. Still others 
– such as leaders, champions and partners – are 
specific to RBD’s current context and would need to 
be replicated for each scenario. However, CDBG-DR 
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implementation award funds would not be possible 
in scenarios that have not experienced disasters.
Recommendation 3:  Future or similar efforts should 
pay particular attention early on to setting the award 
value and assessing the local political, financial 
and regulatory terrain in order to anticipate final 
outputs clearly. RBD has been unique in the world 
of design competition and resilience planning in two 
other noteworthy ways: the dollar value and source 
of the RBD awards. Both of these traits were highly 
influenced by the post-Sandy New York context and 
have played a significant role in motivating – and in 
some cases, thwarting – stakeholders. Securing the 
financial resources and anticipating or preventing 
local political challenges are both critical consider-
ations for future replication of the model.
6.4. Summary
This report presents key observations and findings, 
ranging from the intervention concept to the op-
erational model for innovation design competition. 
It also introduces the key activities of community 
engagement and implementation planning. In par-
ticular, the evaluation assesses RBD’s performance 
compared to its original goals and to similar design 
interventions. However, it should be noted, the 
evaluation looks only at the RBD processes to date 
and embedded within it are several key suppositions 
including the possibility of design, the nature of com-
petition, the regional scale and the room for innova-
tion. The core theme in the vision and, indeed, the 
entire purpose of the RBD enterprise, has focused 
on the need for increasing resilience as one of the 
most critical social and environmental challenge 
of our day. Numerous stakeholders posited some 
profound, if pithy, tenets: “Social cohesion makes re-
silience, not dykes,” and “If we only build a physical 
defense, we’re losing an opportunity for resilience.”8
The Sandy Task Force Report foregrounded resil-
8 Both comments were made during the February 19, 2014 Syracuse 
debate “on process.”
ience not just in disaster policy but also as a binding 
catalyst for reconsidering our individual relation-
ships to our environments. The May 2013 National 
Mitigation Framework confirmed this need, but 
also squarely put the burden on a collective effort: 
“Working together, risks can be recognized and 
addressed through a culture of preparedness and 
mitigation that is built and sustained over time” 
(DHS, 2013). As noted by one RBD stakeholder in an 
unsolicited response: “Disaster response is chaotic. 
RBD is helping change attitudes about how to work 
together.”
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